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ABSTRACT
EVERLASTING SECRECY BY EXPLOITING
EAVESDROPPER’S RECEIVER NON-IDEALITIES
FEBRUARY 2016
AZADEH SHEIKHOLESLAMI
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN
M.Sc., SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dennis L. Goeckel and Professor Hossein Pishro-Nik
This dissertation focuses on secrecy, which is a primary concern in modern com-
munication. Secrecy has traditionally been obtained by cryptography, which is based
on assumptions on current and future computational capabilities of the eavesdropper.
However, there are numerous examples of cryptographic schemes being broken that
were supposedly secure, often when the signal was recorded by the adversary for later
processing. This motivates seeking types of secrecy that are provably everlasting for
sensitive applications. The desire for such everlasting security suggests considering
information-theoretic approaches, where the eavesdropper cannot extract any infor-
mation about the secret message from the received signal. However, since the location
and channel state information of a passive eavesdropper is generally unknown, it is
challenging to know whether the advantage required to achieve information-theoretic
security for a given scenario is provided, and thus attempting to obtain information-
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theoretic security via commonly-envisioned approaches leads to a significant risk in
wireless communication.
In this dissertation, we present a new perspective on how to generate the neces-
sary information-theoretic advantage required for secret communication in the wire-
less environment. The proposed technique does not rely on the channel between
the transmitter and the eavesdropper’s receiver because we exploit receiver’s process-
ing effects for security. In particular, we attack the eavesdropper’s analog-to-digital
(A/D) converter to generate the advantage required to obtain information-theoretic
secrecy, as follows. Based on a key pre-shared between the legitimate nodes that only
needs to be kept secret during transmission (and we pessimistically assume it will
be handed to the adversary immediately afterward) we insert intentional distortion
on the transmitted signal. Since the intended recipient of the signal knows the key
and hence the distortion, it can undo the distortion before his/her A/D, whereas the
eavesdropper must store the signal in memory and try to compensate for the distor-
tion after the A/D conversion. Since the A/D is necessarily a non-linear component of
the receiver, the operations are not necessarily commutative and there is the potential
for information-theoretic security.
This dissertation studies two practical instantiations of this approach to obtain
everlasting secrecy against eavesdroppers with different hardware capabilities. As a
first step, the transmitted signal is modulated by two vastly different power levels
at the transmitter based on the key. Since the intended recipient knows the key,
he/she can undo the power modulation before the A/D, putting the signal in the
appropriate range for analog-to-digital conversion. The eavesdropper, on the other
hand, must compromise between larger quantization noise and more A/D overflows,
and thus will lose information required to recover the message. Hence, information-
theoretic security is obtained. We show that this method can provide information-
theoretic secrecy even when the eavesdropper has perfect access to the output of the
viii
transmitter, and even when the eavesdropper has an A/D that has better quality
than the legitimate receiver’s A/D. A risk of the power modulation approach is a
sophisticated eavesdropper with multiple A/Ds. In our second approach, in order to
attack such an eavesdropper, we introduce the idea of adding random jamming (based
on the ephemeral key) to the signal. In this case the intended recipient can simply
subtract off the jamming signal and its signal will be well-matched to the span of its
A/D converter, while the eavesdropper has difficulty because it does not know the key
during transmission: if it does not change the span of the A/D, it will lose information
due to A/D overflows, and, if it enlarges the span of the A/D to cover all possible
received signal values, the width of each quantization level will be increased, and thus
the eavesdropper will lose information due to high quantization noise. Hence, the
desired advantage for information-theoretic secrecy is obtained. Finally, we study the
combination of random jamming and frequency hopping in wideband channels, and
show that considering the current fundamental limits of analog-to-digital conversion,
this method can provide everlasting secrecy in wireless environments against any
eavesdropper.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Security has traditionally been obtained in wireless communication systems by
encrypting the message so that it is easy for a receiver to decode with the appropriate
key but presents a “hard” problem to the eavesdropper [79]. However, there are
numerous examples of schemes being broken that were supposedly secure, often when
the signal was recorded for later processing and eventually broken [5], which, combined
with recent advances in computation [24, 77], yields clear motivation to consider forms
of security that are provably everlasting. Hence, there has been a revival of interest
in information-theoretic security [70, 85].
However, the employment of information-theoretic security can carry significant
risk in wireless systems. Because a passive eavesdropper’s location is often unknown,
it is difficult to guarantee the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) advantage required to
achieve information-theoretic security for a given scheme. Many researchers have
looked at two-way communication, cooperative jamming, etc, but, as discussed in
Section 1.2, these types of schemes often still have practical shortcomings. Thus, it
can be argued that information-theoretic security has simply traded one form of risk
(assumptions on the eavesdropper’s current and future computational capabilities)
for another type of risk (that a given topology is guaranteed).
In this dissertation, we consider a new perspective for providing secrecy in the
wireless environment. Our approach is based on a very basic observation: nonlinear
systems are not (necessarily) commutative. This motivates us to employ a short-term
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Alice Bob
Eve
Figure 1.1: The wiretap channel.
cryptographic advantage to force the eavesdropper to one ordering of two systems, at
least one of which is nonlinear, while allowing the desired recipient a different ordering.
The approach is such that, even if Eve is immediately handed the key that we used
during the just-completed transmission, she cannot extract the information bits from
what she has recorded.1 In short, the trick is to employ a short-term cryptographic
key (say, obtained through a Diffie-Helman protocol) that is used for “warping” the
signal at the transmitter and receiver. Since the eavesdropper does not obtain the
key until later, her necessarily nonlinear storage operation and (possibly nonlinear)
“unwarping” operations are in a different order than the desired recipient, and this
can be used to obtain a positive secrecy rate.
2
1.2 Background
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless networks, a signal that is sent by a trans-
mitter over the air can be received by any node in its broadcast range. This phe-
nomenon is the source of many potential security threats in a wireless network. In
particular, when a transmitter wants to convey a secret message to the intended re-
cipients, any third party in the broadcast range of the transmitter can overhear the
secret message, making the network vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. A typical
example of such a network, which is called a wiretap channel, is shown in Figure
1.1. The standard method of providing security against eavesdroppers is to encrypt
the information so that it is beyond the eavesdropper’s computational capabilities
to decrypt the message [79]; however, the vulnerability shown by many implemented
cryptographic schemes, the lack of a fundamental proof establishing the difficulty of
the problem presented to the adversary, and the potential for transformative changes
in computing motivate forms of security that are provably everlasting. In particular,
when a cryptographic scheme is employed, the adversary can record the clean cypher
and recover it later when the cryptographic algorithm is broken [5], which is not ac-
ceptable in sensitive applications requiring everlasting secrecy. The desire for such
everlasting security motivates considering emerging information-theoretic approaches,
where the eavesdropper is unable to extract from the received signal any information
about the secret message.
In 1949, Shannon introduced information-theoretic, or perfect, secrecy [70]. If the
uncertainty of the message after seeing the cypher is equal to the uncertainty of the
message before seeing the cypher, we have perfect secrecy without any condition on
the eavesdropper’s capabilities. Wyner later showed that if the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel is degraded with respect to the main channel, adding some randomness to the
1Note the contrast to the one-time pad approach of Shannon [70], where, if Eve records the
transmitted bits and then is handed the key, she can trivially extract the message.
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codebook allows the achievement of a positive secrecy rate [85]. The Gaussian wiretap
channel is investigated in [49]. Csiszár and Körner extended the idea to more general
cases, where the eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily degraded with respect to
the main channel, but it must be “more noisy” or “less capable” than the main channel
[16]. Consequently, the desirable situation for achieving information-theoretic secrecy
is to have a better channel from the transmitter to the intended receiver than that
from the transmitter to the eavesdropper. However, this is not always guaranteed,
particularly in wireless systems where the eavesdropper can have a large advantage
over the intended receiver. In the case of a passive adversary, the eavesdropper can
be very close to the transmitter or it can use a directional antenna to improve its
received signal, while there is often no way for the legitimate nodes to know the
eavesdropper’s location or its channel state information. Recent authors have consid-
ered approaches that relax the need for assumptions on Eve’s location or channel in
one-way systems. For cases when the eavesdropper location is unknown (which means
the case of a “near Eve” must be considered), approaches largely based on the coop-
erative jamming approach of [57] and [30] have been considered [33, 47]. However, all
of these approaches require either multiple antennas, helper nodes, and/or fading (for
example, [31, 29, 76]), and many are susceptible to attacks such as pointing directive
antennas at one or both communicating parties.
Other approaches to obtain information-theoretic security when such an advan-
tage does not exist, are approaches based on “public discussion” [55, 1], but these
approaches, while they could be used to generate an information-theoretically secure
one-time pad, are generally envisioned for secret key agreement to support a cryp-
tographic approach [7, Chapter 7.4] rather than one-way secret communication. We
will show later the relation between our proposed scheme and public discussion, not-
ing, in particular, that the proposed scheme can be used in conjunction with public
discussion when appropriate.
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Figure 1.2: We believe that rather than attacking the memory in the receiver back-
end, one should instead consider attacking the receiver front-end and analog-to-digital
(A/D) conversion process.
For a one-way scenario with a single antenna where Bob’s channel is worse than
Eve’s, Cachin and Maurer [10] exploited the realizability of hardware to consider
the case of everlasting security, as is our interest. In particular, they introduced
the “bounded storage model” in which the receiver cannot store the information it
would need to eventually break the cypher. This novel approach suffers from two
shortcomings: (1) by Moore’s Law (see NAND scaling plot at [45]), the density of
memories increases at an exponential rate; (2) memories can be stacked arbitrarily
subject only to (very) large space limitations. Hence, although the bounded storage
model is a viable approach to everlasting security, it is difficult to pick a memory
size beyond which it will be effective, making its employment for secret wireless
communication difficult. Rather than attacking the memory in the receiver back-
end, our contention is that one should instead consider attacking the receiver front-
end and analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion process (Figure 1.2), where technology
progresses slowly and there exist well-known techniques for severely handicapping the
component. And, unlike memory, A/D’s cannot be stacked arbitrarily, as clock jitter
prevents the timing required for bit detection; in fact, high-quality A/D’s already
employ parallelization to the limit of the jitter. And, importantly from a long-term
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Figure 1.3: The message X is observed at Bob and Eve through the transmitter, the
AWGN channels with different noise variances, and their respective receivers with
(possibly nonlinear) functions g(.), f(.), and fE(.). The sequence k is a cryptographic
key shared by Alice and Bob, which is assumed to be obtained by Eve immediately
after she has recorded Z.
perspective, there is a fundamental bound on the ability to perform A/D conversion
[43, 44].
1.3 Contributions
Consider the channel model shown in Figure 1.3, which reflects the understanding
that in an adversarial game in modern communication systems, it is the interference
effects on wideband receiver front-ends rather than the baseband processing that is the
significant detriment [32]. In particular, the signal is subject to a variety of distortions
due to the RF front-end of the receiver and the analog-to-digital conversion. A large
interferer, even if it is orthogonal to the signal of interest and thus (supposedly)
easily rejected by baseband processing, can saturate the receiver front-end, leading to
nonlinearities, and, of particular interest here, reducing the receiver’s dynamic range
(i.e. resolution) significantly.
The primary focus of this thesis work is to exploit the receiver processing effects
for security. In particular, based on a pre-shared key between Alice and Bob that
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only needs to be kept secret for the duration of the wireless transmission (i.e. it
can be given to Eve immediately afterward), we consider how inserting intentional
(but known to Bob) distortion on the transmitted signal can provide information-
theoretic security. In particular, since Bob knows the distortion, he can undo its
effect before his A/D, whereas Eve must store the signal and try to compensate for
the distortion after her A/D. Since the A/D is necessarily non-linear, the operations
are not necessarily commutative and there is the potential for information-theoretic
security.
This dissertation proposal studies several instantiations of the above approach to
obtain everlasting secrecy against eavesdroppers with different hardware capabilities.
Our contributions are summarized below:
1. Rapid Power Modulation: We introduce a method by which the transmitter and
receiver rapidly modulate their power based on an ephemeral key to obtain ev-
erlasting secrecy in disadvantaged wireless environments.
We introduce the idea that the systems employ general memoryless nonlinear-
ities g(.) and g−1(.) based on the key. The problem of intellectual interest is
then to consider how Alice and Bob can employ the bits of the shared crypto-
graphic key to modify their radios as shown in Figure 1.3 to gain (or maximize)
an information-theoretic advantage. For now, assume that they simply inten-
tionally insert general memoryless nonlinearities g(·) at the transmitter and
f(·) = g−1(·) at the receiver based on the key. Consider just for the moment
that Eve used her obtained key to apply f(·) = g−1(·) to Z, and one sees how
the security is obtained: Bob sees g(X) through g−1(·) and the A/D, whereas
Alice sees those operations in reverse. Since nonlinear operations are not com-
mutative, the signals are not the same and there is the potential for some form
of information-theoretic security.
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As the first practical step, a rapid power modulation instance of this approach
is considered, where the transmitted signal is modulated by two vastly different
power levels at the transmitter. Since Bob knows the key, he can undo the
effect of power modulator before his A/D, putting his signal in the appropri-
ate range for analog-to-digital conversion, while Eve must compromise between
larger quantization noise and more A/D overflows. Consequently, she will lose
information she needs to recover the message, and information-theoretic security
is obtained.
2. Additive Random Jamming: We propose adding random jamming based on an
ephemeral key to obtain everlasting secrecy in disadvantaged wireless environ-
ments and when the eavesdropper has a sophisticated receiver.
A clear risk of the aforementioned approach is a sophisticated eavesdropper
with multiple A/Ds. In order to combat such a sophisticated eavesdropper, we
introduce adding random jamming with large variations to the signal. Suppose
that Alice employs her cryptographically-secure key bits to select an amplitude
from a uniform discrete distribution to add to the transmitted signal. Since
Bob knows the key, he can simply subtract off the jamming signal and continue
normal decoding with an A/D converter well-matched to the span of the sig-
nal. However, Eve does not have knowledge of the key and thus has difficulty
matching the span of her A/D to the received signal. As before, we assume that
the key is handed to Eve as soon as transmission is complete, and obviously
Eve could simply subtract the jamming signal off of her recorded samples in
memory. But, as before, a nonlinear operation (the analog-to-digital converter)
has processed the signal, hence allowing the possibility of information-theoretic
secrecy even when the secret key is handed to Eve immediately after the trans-
mission. Indeed, with her poorly matched A/D, Eve will not have recorded
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a reasonable version of the signal and we will see that information-theoretic
security can be obtained.
3. Wideband Systems: We apply frequency hopping in conjunction with random
jamming to combat any eavesdropper with the best current analog-to-digital con-
version technology.
Next we consider a wideband system, where the legitimate nodes and the eaves-
dropper have access to wideband channels. We use the fact that the product of
bandwidth and resolution of an A/D is limited by its aperture jitter. Since the
channel bandwidth is larger than the signal bandwidth, the legitimate nodes can
employ frequency hopping in conjunction with the additive random jamming
approach. With this extra degree of freedom, Eve will be forced to make an
additional trade-off between A/D resolution and sampling frequency. She must
choose to either use a high resolution A/D with small bandwidth and thus lose
anything outside her bandwidth, or use a wideband A/D with low resolution
and thus be susceptible to the random jamming signal. Technology trend lines
and fundamental limits for A/Ds indicate this will pose a significant challenge
to Eve.
4. Minimum Energy Routing in the Presence of Jammers: We introduce an effi-
cient and effective routing algorithm that only requires knowledge of the mea-
sured jamming at each node.
There has been significant work on passive eavesdropping, ranging from the
study of single communication links, as considered to this point in this disser-
tation, to the study of large networks. But jamming is a simple way to degrade
the signal quality of an opponent by degrading the signal-to-noise ratio at the
opponent’s receiver with in-band jamming. Furthermore, considering above-
mentioned projects, we see that high signal amplitudes at a receiver may not
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only alter the interference level of the channel, but also can greatly impact re-
ceiver operation by compressing the dynamic range of the receiver’s front-end.
Motivated by this observation, we consider wireless communication in the pres-
ence of malicious jammers. In particular, we study minimum energy routing in
a quasi-static multi-path fading environment in the presence of multiple static
and dynamic jammers.
In a multihop wireless network, where nodes communicate with each other over
paths that go through potentially multiple intermediate nodes, jammers can in-
terfere with transmission at every node along the path to block the destination
from receiving the messages. A straightforward approach to dealing with such
jammers would be to employ standard shortest path routing, agnostic to the
impact of the jammers, and then employ physical-layer techniques (e.g. spread
spectrum) that are resistant to the jamming. However, whereas physical-layer
approaches can provide significant gains against such jamming (e.g. reducing
the interference power by the processing gain), the residual jamming can still
severely limit system performance. This motivates the consideration of routing
approaches that react to the differences in the jamming environment between
different paths. Hence, here we formulate the minimum energy routing prob-
lem in the presence of static and dynamic jammers. A difficulty in solving this
problem is deciding the local outage of the links that form a path from source to
destination so that the path satisfies an end-to-end outage requirement. First,
we take a straightforward approach where an equal outage probability is allo-
cated to each of the links along the path and develop a minimum energy routing
solution under such an assumption. Next, we demonstrate the shortcomings of
such an approach by illustrating situations where it is advantageous to allocate
different outage probabilities to different links along the path. Motivated by
this observation, we consider the general problem of minimum energy routing
10
with optimal outage allocation along paths. Faced by an intractable optimiza-
tion problem, we employ an approximation to the link outage probability that
yields an efficient and effective algorithm that only requires knowledge of param-
eters of the jammers that are easily obtained by the system nodes. The amount
of energy saved by the proposed method with respect to the benchmark short-
est path routing and the straightforward equal outage allocation approach is
evaluated. It is shown that the amount of energy saved, especially in terrestrial
wireless networks with path-loss exponents greater than two, is substantial.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Security is an important aspect of any type of communication, ranging from
electronic-commerce and protecting passwords to diplomatic missives. In particu-
lar, because of the broadcast nature of wireless networks, any node in the coverage
range of a transmitter can overhear any message that it transmits, and thus one of
the most important and difficult considerations of wireless networks is secrecy. The
traditional approach to obtain secrecy is encryption of the message such that it is
hard for the adversary to decrypt. However, the desire for everlasting security mo-
tivates considering emerging information-theoretic approaches. In the remainder of
this chapter, we provide a short background of both cryptographic and information-
theoretic secrecy, and investigate the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
Next, we will turn to approaches that attack features of hardware of the eavesdropper
for everlasting secrecy.
2.1 Cryptographic Secrecy
In cryptography, the plain message is encrypted by means of special functions that
are assumed to be computationally infeasible for the eavesdropper to decrypt. Most
of the cryptographic algorithms can be classified into the following two categories:
• Secret-key cryptography: employs a shared secret-key for both encryption and
decryption.
• Public-key cryptography: employs a key for encryption and another key for
decryption.
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2.1.1 Secret-key cryptography
In secret-key cryptography, or symmetric cryptography, a single shared secret-key
is used for both encryption and decryption. The secret key encryption techniques
can be categorized into block-ciphers and stream-ciphers. A block-cipher operates on
fixed-length blocks of data with a deterministic transformation specified by the key.
A stream-cipher operates with a time-varying transformation on a single digit at a
time. Two well-known examples of secret key encryption algorithms are DES (Data
Encryption Standard), and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). The important
difficulty of secret-key cryptography is the establishment of a secret-key between
legitimate parties. This can be hard in particular in wireless applications, where
no private communication channel exists. Another disadvantage of these algorithms
is the possibility of key leakage. If the adversary somehow obtains the key, it can
decrypt all of the communication easily.
2.1.2 Public-key cryptography
The aforementioned problems of secret-key cryptography can be solved using
public-key encryption algorithms. With public-key cryptography, two parties, with-
out having a shared secret in advance, can generate a private key over an insecure
channel, which can be used to exchange information over the public channel. The
public-key cryptography employs trapdoor functions. The trapdoor functions are
easy to compute in one direction, but it is computationally difficult to compute their
inverse. The idea of employing these functions for public-key cryptography was first
described by Diffie and Hellman [18]. Here we explain the original Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol:
1. Alice and Bob agree to use two prime numbers p and g, where g is a prime
number modulo p. In practice, p is a large prime number (usually at least 512
bits).
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2. Alice and Bob each choose a large random real number, say a and b, respectively.
The value of a and b are kept secret.
3. Alice computes A = ga mod p and sends it to Bob. Bob computes B = gb
mod p and sends it to Alice.
4. Alice computes S = Ba mod p = gab mod p, and Bob computes S = Ab
mod p = gab mod p, where S is the common secret.
The security of this algorithm is based on the fact that using conventional computers,
there is no efficient way to compute a from p, g, and A, which is called the discrete
logarithm problem. Hence, Alice and Bob are able to share the secret S with back
and forth communications over a public channel.
2.1.3 Challenges of cryptographic secrecy
Currently, the standard way to provide secrecy is cryptography. As an example
of secret-key cryptography, AES-256 is approved and used widely to protect top-
secret data. Among public-key cryptosystems, 1028-bit Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
is currently secure. But, is there any guarantee that the current crypto-systems will
be secure in the future, say in 50 years? Unfortunately the answer is no. There is a
fundamental problem that calls into question the reliability of cryptographic secrecy:
cryptographic secrecy relies on the strong assumption of limited computational capa-
bility of the adversary, and the reason that these ciphers are assumed to be secure is
that several people have tried to break them and nobody has succeeded. Thus, it is
likely that one of the following scenarios will happen:
1. It is possible that certain tasks, like prime factorization will turn out to be
easier than anticipated. This is the result of the fact that in cryptographic
secrecy, there is no fundamental proof establishing the difficulty of the problem
presented to the adversary.
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2. There is the potential for dramatic changes in computing power. According to
Moore’s law, the number of transistors in an integrated circuit doubles every
2 years. This results in vast advances in computation abilities over the years.
For instance, the CPU of a smart-phone today has a processor with a speed
of 1.29 GHz, and 1GB of RAM, which is vastly more powerful than a NASA
super computer that sent Apollo 11 astronauts (2 MHz processor speed, 4 KB
memory) into space 50 years ago.
3. It is possible that other forms of computation, for example quantum computa-
tion, will be implemented.
An eavesdropper can record the message and has an unlimited amount of time
(say, 50 years as a lower bound to unlimited) to break that key. Obviously, the eaves-
dropper then has not only a longer processing time, but can also take advantage of
what are certain to be significant technological advances in algorithms, computation,
and methods of hacking the key from one of the parties. And with advances like
quantum computation possible in the future, it is clear that there is great risk in
assuming that the eavesdropper’s capability will not vary with time. A historical
example of this is the Venona project, where messages that were secure locally at
the time of transmission were recorded, were broken many years later by exploiting
weakness of the cryptographic scheme, and were still of great value [5]. The desire
for everlasting secrecy motivates considering information-theoretic approaches, where
the eavesdropper is unable to extract any information about the secret message from
the received signal.
2.2 Information-Theoretic Secrecy
In 1949, Shannon introduced the notion of perfect secrecy [70]: if the eavesdrop-
per’s uncertainty (entropy) about the plain message after seeing the transmitted signal
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Figure 2.1: The wiretap channel.
is equal to the eavesdropper’s uncertainty about the message before seeing the trans-
mitted signal, then perfect secrecy is said to be achieved. An example of this is the
one-time-pad. But with the one-time-pad, the length of the secret-key must be as
long as the length of the message, which makes it impractical.
Note that in cryptography and Shannon’s perfect secrecy, we assume that the
eavesdropper can see the clean cipher. However, in practice the eavesdropper usually
sees the message through a channel. Hence, we can relax the assumption that the
eavesdropper sees the clean cipher. Based on this, in 1975 Wyner introduced the
wiretap channel (Figure 2.1). He showed that, in a degraded wiretap channel, adding
randomness to the codebook and using channel uncertainty can protect the secret
message from being intercepted by the eavesdropper [85]. He introduced the notion
of secrecy rate, which is the rate at which the message can be sent from Alice to
Bob reliably such that the information that Eve receives about the secret message is
negligible. Later, in 1978 the idea of the wiretap channel was extended by Csiszár
and Körner to more general cases, where the eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily
degraded with respect to the main channel, but it must be “more noisy” or “less capa-
ble” than the main channel [16]. The secrecy rate of a Gaussian wiretap channel was
obtained by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman in 1978 [49] as the difference between
the capacity of the channel between Alice and Bob and the capacity of the channel
16
between Alice and Eve:
Rs = log2(1 + SNRAB)− log2(1 + SNRAE) (2.1)
where the secrecy rate is positive when SNRAB > SNRAE. From different types of
wiretap channels mentioned above, it is apparent that the key to a positive secrecy
rate is to have a better channel from the transmitter to the intended receiver than to
the eavesdropper. However, this advantage cannot always be guaranteed in a wireless
network. An Eve near the transmitter (a "near Eve") or an Eve with a directional
antenna can receive whatever Alice transmits, possibly with a better quality than the
quality with which Bob receives the message. Even worse, in the case of a passive
eavesdropper, the location and channel state information of Eve is not known to the
legitimate nodes, and thus the legitimate nodes do not know for what quality of Eve’s
channel they should plan. In the following sections, we review the most important
techniques proposed in the literature that try to create an information-theoretic ad-
vantage when the legitimate nodes are at a channel disadvantage compared to the
eavesdropper.
2.2.1 Artificial Noise and Cooperative Jamming
Negi and Goel introduced approaches based on using artificial noise and coopera-
tive jamming. The main goal of these approaches is to modify the channels to build
an advantage for the legitimate nodes over the eavesdropper. Suppose that Alice has
multiple antennas. She can use her antennas to add artificial noise to her message
such that the noise is in the null space of the channel from Alice to Bob. This artificial
noise does not affect Bob’s channel, but degrades Eve’s channel with high probability
[57].
Now suppose that Alice has a single antenna, but in addition to Alice and Bob,
some helper nodes with directional antennas are present in the network. When Alice
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transmits the message to Bob, the helper nodes produce artificial noise in such a way
that the noise can be canceled out at Bob’s receiver, but not at Eve’s receiver, and
thus the desirable advantage for the main channel is obtained [30]. Subsequently,
cooperative jamming and using helper nodes for physical layer secrecy has been ex-
tensively investigated in the literature [81, 82, 19, 29, 76].
Although these methods can provide secrecy in many scenarios, they have some
drawbacks. One disadvantage of these approaches is the necessity of having either
multiple antennas at the transmitter, or multiple helper nodes in the network, which
are not always available. The second disadvantage is that in order to know the se-
crecy rates that can be guaranteed, the channel state information of the eavesdropper
must be known. Finally, the secrecy rate when the eavesdropper has perfect access to
the output of the transmitter is zero. Although having perfect access to the output
of transmitter seems somewhat pessimistic, this scenario is realistic since it is pos-
sible that Eve picks up the transmitter radio and receives whatever Alice transmits
perfectly.
2.2.2 Exploiting Multipath Fading
Another approach to provide physical layer secrecy is to use the effect of multi-
path fading on the signal. In wireless communication, because of the existence of
reflectors in the environment, the signal reaching the receiver usually comes from
more than one path. Considering a wiretap channel, multipath fading causes the
strength of the signal at Bob’s and Eve’s receiver to change over time (2.2). Hence,
although the average signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received at Bob might be less
than the average signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received at Eve, there are some
instances that the quality of signal at Bob is better than the quality of signal at
Eve, and thus the legitimate nodes can use these instances to communicate. Using
fading to obtain physical layer secrecy was introduced by Barros and Rodrigues [3].
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Figure 2.2: With fading the instantaneous secrecy capacity can be positive.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it relies on fading, and in an environment
without fading does not work. Further, the CSI of Eve’s channel must be known by
the legitimate nodes, and similar to the previous method the secrecy rate when Eve
has a noiseless channel is zero.
2.2.3 Public Discussion
Other approaches to obtain information-theoretic security when an advantage for
the legitimate nodes does not exist are schemes based on public discussion [55, 1],
which utilize two-way communication channels and a public authenticated channel to
allow the legitimate nodes to agree on a secret key by extracting information from
realizations of correlated random variables (Figure 2.3). This secret-key can then
be used in a one-time-pad for secret communication between Alice and Bob. For
a simplistic example to see how public discussion works, consider binary symmetric
channels and suppose that Alice transmits a signal X. Bob and Eve each receive a
noisy version of the signal that Alice sends, X + E and X + D, respectively. Bob
adds a random message V to what he received, and puts it on a noiseless feedback
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Binary symetric channel Figure 2.3: A wiretap channel with public authenticated feedback.
channel. Alice and Eve both get what Bob sent perfectly. Alice XORs the received
signal with X and obtains X +E. If Eve does the same, she will obtain V +E +D.
Hence, even if Bob’s channel is noisier than Eve’s channel (E > D), eventually the
noise between Alice and Bob is less than the noise between Bob and Eve.
While public discussion can provide secrecy when the main channel is at a disad-
vantage with respect to the eavesdropper’s channel, the secret data rates are usually
low and thus it is usually used for secret-key agreement for cryptography. Also, the
secrecy rate when the eavesdropper has perfect access to the output of the transmit-
ter is zero. Further, when the signal-to-noise ratio at Bob’s receiver is less than the
signal-to-noise ratio at Eve’s receiver (which is the scenario of interest) the secrecy
rate drops quickly, as it will be shown in Chapter 3.
2.2.4 Challenges of information-theoretic secrecy
With information-theoretic secrecy, there is no condition on Eve’s current and
future capabilities, and if the scenario is right and thus the message goes through the
channel securely, Eve would never get any information about the message, no matter
for how long and with what computational capability she works on it.
However, for information-theoretic secrecy the knowledge of CSI (channel-state-
information) of Eve and its location is necessary, which is not possible in most eaves-
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dropping scenarios. Further, the channel to Eve must be noisy, which is a condition
that cannot always be guaranteed. On the other hand, in cryptography there is no
assumption on the channels. So many would argue that we have traded a long-term
computational risk (cryptography) for a short-term scenario (information-theoretic
secrecy) risk.
2.3 Bounded Storage Model
2.3.1 Introduction
Recalling our goal, we aim to keep Eve from recording a signal from which she can
later extract the information. Hence, we consider attacking aspects of the hardware
of Eve to obtain an information-theoretic advantage.
Prior work in this area includes the bounded storage model of Cachin and Maurer
[54, 10]. In this scheme, a bound for the size of memory of the adversary is assumed.
Also, it is assumed that all users have access to a very long public string of random bits
which is called a randomizer. In order to decipher the transferred message later, the
adversary must record the entire randomizer in her memory. However, the randomizer
is too large to be stored in the memory of the adversary. The legitimate nodes, using
their initial small key K and only a small portion of the randomizer, can obtain an
information-theoretically secret bit string X. Then the randomizer R disappears. It
is pessimistically assumed that the key K will be handed to Eve when she loses access
to R. However, it is shown that using what Eve already recorded in her storage and
the key K, she can not obtain X. Hence, the bit string X can be used as a secure
one-time pad to convey a message from Alice to Bob with everlasting secrecy.
The operation of the legitimate nodes in [54] over the randomizer is depicted in
Figure 2.4. The randomizer R is shown as a two-dimensional k × t array. The initial
key K is a vector K = (K1, . . . , Kk). We choose a n-bit block from each row of R,
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Figure 2.4: The values K1, . . . , Kk are determined by the initial key. The bit string
X is equal to the element-wise XOR of all the colored blocks.
where the first index of each block is chosen by the elements of the vector K. The
bit string X is equal to element-wise XOR of all blocks.
The proof provided in [54] is for the case that Eve is restricted to access a limited
number of bits of the randomizer and store them in her memory; however, in general
Eve is able to apply any pre-processing function f(.) to the entire randomizer and
record resultant bits in her limited storage space. Later, Cachin and Maurer [10]
proposed a protocol for the bounded storage model that provides security for a system
with an eavesdropper that can access all randomizer bits; however, the probability of
disclosure of the information about X in this protocol is not negligible. Furthermore,
their protocol is sophisticated and needs Alice and Bob to store and transmit a very
large amount of data and perform complicated and time consuming calculations.
Finally, [22] gives an ultimate answer to this problem. It shows that the function
of Maurer [54] is secure for a bounded storage model against an Eve with memory
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bound around |B| < |R|/10, and in theory everlasting security can be obtained when
Eve’s storage space can be arbitrarily close to |R|, i.e. |B| = (1− )|R|.
2.3.2 Challenge of Bounded Storage Model
The challenge of the bounded storage model is that it is hard to pick a memory
size beyond which Eve will not have access. According to Moore’s law, the capacity
of memories doubles every 18 months, which basically means that memories’ capacity
increases exponentially over time. Furthermore, memories can always be stacked to
obtain a larger storage space. Hence, Eve can employ many memories in parallel
to obtain a very large memory and record the entire randomizer in her storage to
decipher the secret message when she later obtains the key.
These drawbacks of the bounded storage model led us to wonder if the bounded
storage model targets the wrong part of the receiver. So, instead of attacking the
memory in the digital back-end of the receiver, we have decided to attack the analog-
to-digital converter (A/D) in the analog front-end of the receiver, since:
1. The analog front-end has a limited dynamic range which can be saturated if the
amplitude of the received signal is too large.
2. Unlike memories, A/D technology progresses very slowly. For instance, the A/D
aperture jitter has stagnated since 2005.
3. High-end A/Ds are already stacked to the limit of the clock jitter. So we cannot
connect A/Ds to construct an A/D with more resolution and dynamic range.
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CHAPTER 3
EVERLASTING SECRECY BY EXPLOITING
NON-IDEALITIES OF THE EAVESDROPPER’S
RECEIVER
In this chapter, we consider secure communication over a memoryless wiretap
channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Traditional information-theoretic
security methods require an advantage for the main channel over the eavesdropper
channel to achieve a positive secrecy rate, which in general cannot be guaranteed
in wireless systems. Here, we exploit the non-linear conversion operation in the
eavesdropper’s receiver to obtain the desired advantage - even when the eavesdropper
has perfect access to the transmitted signal at the input to their receiver. The basic
idea is to employ an ephemeral cryptographic key to force the eavesdropper to conduct
two operations, at least one of which is non-linear, in a different order than the
desired recipient. Since non-linear operations are not necessarily commutative, the
desired advantage can be obtained and information-theoretic secrecy achieved even
if the eavesdropper is given the cryptographic key immediately upon transmission
completion. In essence, the lack of knowledge of the key during the short transmission
time inhibits the recording of the signal in such a way that the secret information can
never be extracted from it. The achievable secrecy rates for different countermeasures
that the eavesdropper might employ are evaluated. It is shown that even in the case
of an eavesdropper with uniformly better conditions (channel and receiver quality)
than the intended recipient, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved.
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3.1 Introduction
Wireless networks, due to their broadcast nature, are vulnerable to being over-
heard, and hence security is a primary concern. The standard method of providing
security against eavesdroppers is to encrypt the information so that it is beyond the
eavesdropper’s computational capabilities to decrypt the message [79]; however, the
vulnerability shown by many implemented cryptographic schemes, the lack of a fun-
damental proof establishing the difficulty of the problem presented to the adversary,
and the potential for transformative changes in computing motivate forms of secu-
rity that are provably everlasting. In particular, when a cryptographic scheme is
employed, the adversary can record the clean cypher and recover it later when the
cryptographic algorithm is broken [5], which is not acceptable in sensitive applications
requiring everlasting secrecy. The desire for such everlasting security motivates con-
sidering emerging information-theoretic approaches, where the eavesdropper is unable
to extract from the received signal any information about the secret message.
In 1949, Shannon introduced information-theoretic, or perfect, secrecy [70]. If
the uncertainty of the message after seeing the cypher is equal to the uncertainty of
the message before seeing the cypher, we have perfect secrecy without any condition
on the eavesdropper’s capabilities. Wyner later showed that if the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to the main channel, adding some randomness to
the codebook allows the achievement of a positive secrecy rate [85]. Csiszár and
Körner extended the idea to more general cases, where the eavesdropper’s channel is
not necessarily degraded with respect to the main channel, but it must be “more noisy”
or “less capable” than the main channel [16]. When such an advantage does not exist,
one can turn to approaches based on “public discussion” [55, 1], but these approaches,
while they could be used to generate an information-theoretically secure one-time pad,
are generally envisioned for secret key agreement to support a cryptographic approach
[7, Chapter 7.4] rather than one-way secret communication. We will show later the
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relation between our proposed scheme and public discussion, noting, in particular,
that the proposed scheme can be used in conjunction with public discussion when
appropriate.
Consequently, the desirable situation for achieving information-theoretic secrecy
is to have a better channel from the transmitter to the intended receiver than that
from the transmitter to the eavesdropper. However, this is not always guaranteed,
particularly in wireless systems where the eavesdropper can have a large advantage
over the intended receiver. In the case of a passive adversary, the eavesdropper can
be very close to the transmitter or it can use a directional antenna to improve its
received signal, while there is often no way for the legitimate nodes to know the
eavesdropper’s location or its channel state information. Recent authors have consid-
ered approaches that relax the need for assumptions on Eve’s location or channel in
one-way systems. For cases when the eavesdropper location is unknown (which means
the case of a “near Eve” must be considered), approaches largely based on the coop-
erative jamming approach of [57] and [30] have been considered [33, 47]. However, all
of these approaches require either multiple antennas, helper nodes, and/or fading (for
example, [31, 29, 76]), and many are susceptible to attacks such as pointing directive
antennas at one or both communicating parties.
For a one-way scenario with a single antenna where Bob’s channel is worse than
Eve’s, Cachin and Maurer [10] exploited the realizability of hardware to consider
the case of everlasting security, as is our interest. In particular, they introduced
the “bounded storage model” in which the receiver cannot store the information it
would need to eventually break the cypher. This novel approach suffers from two
shortcomings: (1) by Moore’s Law (see NAND scaling plot at [45]), the density of
memories increases at an exponential rate; (2) memories can be stacked arbitrarily
subject only to (very) large space limitations. Hence, although the bounded storage
model is a viable approach to everlasting security, it is difficult to pick a memory
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size beyond which it will be effective, making its employment for secret wireless
communication difficult. Rather than attacking the memory in the receiver back-end,
our contention is that one should instead consider attacking the receiver front-end
and analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion process, where technology progresses slowly
and there exist well-known techniques for severely handicapping the component. And,
unlike memory, A/D’s cannot be stacked arbitrarily, as clock jitter prevents the timing
required for bit detection; in fact, high-quality A/D’s already employ parallelization
to the limit of the jitter. And, importantly from a long-term perspective, there is
a fundamental bound on the ability to perform A/D conversion [43, 44]. Consider
the channel model shown in Figure 1.3, which reflects the understanding that in
an adversarial game in modern communication systems, it is the interference effects
on wideband receiver front-ends rather than the baseband processing that is the
significant detriment [32]. In particular, the signal is subject to a variety of distortions
due to the RF front-end of the receiver and the analog-to-digital conversion. A large
interferer, even if it is orthogonal to the signal of interest and thus (supposedly)
easily rejected by baseband processing, can saturate the receiver front-end, leading to
nonlinearities, and, of particular interest here, reducing the receiver’s dynamic range
(i.e. resolution) significantly.
The primary focus of this chapter is to exploit the receiver processing effects for
security. In particular, based on a pre-shared key between Alice and Bob that only
needs to be kept secret for the duration of the wireless transmission (i.e. it can be given
to Eve immediately afterward), we consider how inserting intentional (but known to
Bob) distortion on the transmitted signal can provide information-theoretic security.
In particular, since Bob knows the distortion, he can undo its effect before his A/D,
whereas Eve must store the signal and try to compensate for the distortion after
her A/D. Since the A/D is necessarily non-linear, the operations are not necessarily
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commutative and there is the potential for information-theoretic security. This work
introduces this idea and initiates its investigation.
As a first example, we perform a rapid power modulation between two vastly
different power levels at the transmitter and put the reciprocal of that power gain be-
fore Bob’s A/D. In particular, cellular (and other) networks usually have significantly
more power available for users at many locations than their lowest data rate requires
for successful transmission. For example, users near a base station in a cellular system
have the capability to transmit significantly more power than the minimum required
to convey a high-quality voice signal. Hence, a secure communication system to cover
a restricted area (e.g. a company’s building) built on analogous link budgets to cel-
lular technology would have the capability to transmit excess power to enable secure
communication, as follows. Suppose Alice employs an ephemeral cryptographic key
known only to her and Bob to rapidly modulate her transmit power between the
minimum required for successful transmission and the maximum available from her
radio. This power modulation can be done quite rapidly, as modern power amplifiers
can easily have their power switched at high bandwidths [37][38, Chapter 7]. Bob,
since he knows the key, places a gain before his A/D that changes rapidly in concert
with the transmitted power to ensure that the received signal is matched to the range
of the A/D. Since the power can be changed every symbol, Eve cannot use any type
of automatic gain control (AGC) loop and is left trying to select a gain that trades
off resolution and the probability of overflow of her A/D. By exploiting the resulting
distortion, information-theoretic secrecy can be obtained, even if Eve is given the key
immediately after message transmission.
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3.2 System Model and Approach
3.2.1 System Model and Metric
We consider a simple wiretap channel, which consists of a transmitter, Alice, a
receiver, Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve. Eve is a passive eavesdropper, i.e. she just
tries to obtain as much information as possible to recover the message that Alice
sends and she does not attempt to actively thwart (i.e. via jamming, signal insertion)
the legitimate nodes. Therefore, the location and channel state information of Eve
can be difficult to obtain and thus is assumed unknown to the legitimate nodes.
We assume that Alice and Bob either pre-share a (very) short initial key or that
they employ a standard key agreement scheme (e.g. Diffie-Hellman [18], which is very
efficient in passive environments) to generate a shared key. This initial key will be
used to generate a very long key-sequence by using a standard cryptographic method
such as AES in counter mode (CTR). Considering the fact that for each 238 bits of
the key-sequence, a 96-bit new initial vector (IV) or a 128-bit new initial key must be
sent from Alice to Bob [58, Chapter 5], the secrecy rate overhead that this key (or IV)
exchange imposes is at most 128/238 = 2−29, which is negligible. Another method is
to use standard methods that are specifically designed for generating stream-ciphers,
such as Trivium (more methods can be found in [65]), which can generate 264 bits of
key-sequence for a 80-bit key and a 80-bit IV. Thus, the rate overhead that Trivium
places on our scheme will be 80/264 < 2−55, which is negligible.
By using these cryptographic algorithms to perform key-expansion, we assume
that Eve cannot recover the initial key before the key renewal and during the trans-
mission period, i.e. we assume that the computational power of Eve during the time
of transmission is not unlimited. However, our system design only employs the key
ephemerally. In fact, we assume (pessimistically) that Eve is handed the full key (and
not just the initial key) as soon as transmission is complete. Hence, unlike cryptogra-
phy, even if the encryption system is broken later, the eavesdropper obtains access to
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an unlimited computational power, or other forms of computation such as quantum
computers are implemented, Eve will not have enough information to recover the
secret message.
We consider a memoryless one-way communication system, and assume that both
Bob and Eve are at a unit distance from the transmitter by including variations in
the path-loss in the noise variance. Thus, the channel gain of both channels is unity
and both channels experience additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Let nB and
nE denote the zero-mean noise processes at Bob’s and Eve’s receivers with variances
σ2B and σE2, respectively. Let Xˆ denote the input of both channels, Yˆ denote the
received signal at Bob’s receiver, and Zˆ denote the received signal at Eve’s receiver.
The signal at Bob’s receiver is:
Yˆ = Xˆ + nB,
and the signal at Eve’s receiver is:
Zˆ = Xˆ + nE.
We assume that location of Alice is known to Eve. Also, Alice knows either Eve’s
location, or in the case that she does not know Eve’s location, she sets a value that
works over a set of locations (for example, the minimum possible distance between
Alice and Eve). If the location of Eve is completely unknown, Eve’s distance can
assumed to be zero and, as will be shown in Section 3.4, the legitimate nodes will still
be able to obtain a positive secrecy rate by using the proposed scheme.
Both Bob and Eve employ high precision uniform analog-to-digital converters.
The effect of the A/D on the received signal (quantization error) is modeled by a
quantization noise due to the limitation in the size of each quantization level, and
a clipping function due to the quantizer’s overflow. The quantization noise in this
case is (approximately) uniformly distributed [84], so we will assume it is uniformly
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distributed throughout this chapter. For an m-bit quantizer (b = 2m gray levels) over
the full dynamic range [−l, l], two adjacent quantization levels are spaced by δ = 2l/b,
and thus the quantization noise is uniformly distributed over an interval of length δ.
Quantizer overflow happens when the amplitude of the received signal is greater than
the quantizer’s dynamic range, which can be modeled by a clipping function. We
assume that Alice knows an upper bound on Eve’s current A/D conversion ability
(without any assumption on Eve’s future A/D conversion capabilities).
Let X denote the current code symbol, which we assume is taken from a standard
Gaussian codebook where each entry has variance P , i.e. X ∼ N (0, P ). Note that
although the Gaussian codebook is optimal to achieve the secrecy capacity in the case
of AWGN wiretap channels, because we consider quantization errors in our model,
the Gaussian codebook is no longer optimum, implying that our results represent
achievable rates but not upper bounds.
From [8], for an arbitrary stationary memoryless wiretap channel with arbitrary
input and output alphabets, any secrecy rate
Rˆs < max
X→Y Z
[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]
is achievable.
Now, we define the following max-min criteria:
Rs = max
s∈S
min
s′∈S′
Rˆs(s, s
′) (3.1)
where S ′ is the set of strategies that Eve can take during transmission, and S is the
set of strategies that Alice can take. Eve’s problem is to find a strategy, s′ ∈ S ′, to
modify her channel to minimize the secrecy rate. On the other hand, Alice’s problem
is to find a strategy, s ∈ S, to modify the transmit signal to maximize this worst-case
secrecy rate.
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When cryptographic key expansion schemes are employed, the key-sequence is not
quite memoryless. But, based on the assumption that Eve cannot restrict the rest of
the key sequence based on the observed symbols, we assume independence. Hence,
although in general the strategy taken by Eve is not memoryless, here considering
strategies with memory does not help her to increase the information-leakage; thus, we
restrict S ′ to memoryless strategies. Further, we give the key to Eve after completion
of the transmission and show she cannot recover the lost information she would need
to obtain the secret message from the recorded symbols.
3.2.2 General Nonlinearity: Rough Analysis
Our goal is to consider how Alice and Bob can employ bits of the shared key to
modify their radios as shown in Figure 1.3 to gain (or maximize) an information-
theoretic advantage. For now, assume that they insert general memoryless nonlin-
earities g(.) at the transmitter and f(.) = g−1(.) at the receiver based on the key.
Suppose that Eve is able to obtain the key just after the transmission is finished;
considering for the moment that she applies g−1(.) to Z, one sees how the security
is (potentially) obtained: Bob sees g(X) through g−1(.) and the A/D, whereas Eve
sees those operations in reverse. Since nonlinear operations are not (necessarily) com-
mutative, the signals are not the same and there is the potential for some form of
information-theoretic security.
Now, stepping back to allow Eve to use the long key sequence, k, in what-
ever manner she wants after she has recorded the transmission yields an illustrative
information-theoretic model. In particular, using the same random coding arguments
as for fading channels, consider a collection of functions G, from which k selects a
function g(.) for each transmitted symbol; then, the secrecy rate is:
Rs = Eg(.)[I(X;Y |g(.))− I(X;Z|g(.))]
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Let us be pessimistic and assume σ2E = 0. Furthermore, to get some insight, assume
temporarily that σ2B = 0, corresponding to a short-range situation which is not power-
limited. For σ2B = 0, Y does not depend on k and thus using the approach for
analyzing quantizers of [15, pg. 251], which is accurate at high resolution:
Rs = Eg(.)[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z|g(.))]
= Eg(.)[H(Y )−H(Y |X)− (H(Z|g(.))−H(Z|X, g(.)))]
≈ Eg(.)[h(Y˜ )− log(δ)− (h(Z˜|g(.))− log(δ))]
= Eg(.)[h(Y˜ )− h(Z˜|g(.))]
= Eg(.)[h(X)− h(g(X))]
where Y˜ and Z˜ are the inputs to Bob and Eve’s A/D converters, respectively. It then
becomes apparent that the gain observed here for high-resolution A/D’s at both Bob
and Eve is a shaping gain between X and g(X). Whereas we think of shaping gains as
tending to be relatively small (1.53 dB on the Gaussian channel [12]), that is because
the generally considered gains are between the optimal (Gaussian) shaping and a
standard but reasonable (uniform) shaping. In our design scenario, if we are able to
severely distort the signal, the gains can become enormous. We quickly caveat this
conclusion by noting that the assumption σ2B = 0 is critical, since those g(.) which
are most distorting can also cause significant “noise enhancement” on the channel
from Alice to Bob. Hence, unless the noise is truly negligible (i.e. very short range
communication), judgment should be reserved on the applicability of the technique
until σ2B 6= 0 is considered in Section 3.3.
3.2.3 Rapid Power Modulation for Secrecy
For the rest of this chapter, we simplify the operator g(.) to a random gain to
consider a practical architecture easily implemented and discuss specific operating
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Figure 3.1: Alice and Bob share a cryptographic key that determines the value of A
at each time instance. Eve puts a (possibly variable) gain before her A/D to decrease
the A/D erasures and/or overflows and hence increase the information leakage.
scenarios. Our goal is to achieve a positive secrecy rate by confusing Eve’s A/D.
Throughout this chapter we assume that Eve is able to employ just one A/D, and
Eve with multiple A/D’s is briefly discussed in Section 3.5. The random gain is from a
fixed probability distribution and is multiplied to the signal amplitude of each symbol
that Alice transmits. Suppose that A denotes the random variable associated with
this random gain, and the probability density function (pdf) of this gain is pA(a)
where a ∈ A (see Figure 3.1). The pdf of A is known to all nodes, but only legitimate
nodes know the exact sequence of values of A (i.e. a1, a2, a3, · · · ) that is applied to
the symbol sequence.
We want to find a probability distribution for A that maximizes this secrecy
rate such that it does not change the average power of the transmitted signal, i.e.
E[|A|2] = 1. To control the number of key bits required, we consider that |A| is drawn
from one of two levels A1 and A2 with random polarity (i.e. A = {A1,−A1, A2,−A2}):
Pr(A = a) =
 p, a = A11− p, a = A2
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and Pr{A > 0} = Pr{A < 0} = 1/2. Suppose that A1 is the large gain and A2 is the
small gain that the transmitter applies and denote the ratio between them r = A1
A2
.
Since Bob shares the (long) key with Alice, he easily “inverts” the gain A to operate
his A/D properly, whereas Eve will struggle with such. In essence, we are inducing a
fading channel at Bob that he is able to equalize before his A/D, whereas Eve cannot.
Bob applies the reciprocal of A before his A/D and thus given A, the signal that
Bob’s A/D sees is:
Y˜ = X +
nB
A
(3.2)
To cancel the effect of this gain, Eve also applies an arbitrary (possibly random) gain,
1/G. So, the signal at Eve’s A/D given A and G is:
Z˜ =
A
G
X +
nE
G
(3.3)
Suppose that Eve knows the pdf of A; hence, she tries to find a probability density
function pG(g) for G such that it minimizes the secrecy rate Rs. On the other hand,
Alice sets the pdf parameters such that no matter what pG(g) Eve chooses, some
secrecy rate Rs is always guaranteed. Hence, the maxi-min criteria in (3.1) turns
into:
Rs = max
p,A1,A2
min
pG(.)
Rˆs(pG(.), A1, A2, p) (3.4)
Obviously, larger r = A1
A2
leads to more eavesdropper confusion. However, because
E[|A|2] = 1, r  1 leads to a small A2, and Bob then suffers noise enhancement. We
talk about the choice of r in the next paragraph.
Recall the potential operating scenario from Section 3.1, and assume that sys-
tem radios are operating in a scenario where they have adequate power amplifier
headroom, as in the “near” situation in cellular systems [41], and the user’s noise is
relatively negligible. However, an Eve at the same range can also intercept the signal.
By changing the power of the transmitters between the power-controlled level (e.g.
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A2), where it meets the receiver requirements and its maximum power (e.g. A1), Bob,
knowing the sequence, obtains a signal that is at least equivalent to operating at its
power controlled level and thus sees little degradation in information transmission.
The ratio between the large gain and the small gain, r, can be chosen such that in the
case of A = A2 (small gain), the minimum acceptable signal level at Bob’s receiver is
satisfied. On the other hand, Eve’s A/D struggles even to record a reasonable form of
the signal; hence, she sees significant degradation, and information-theoretic security
is obtained. Also, because the power level is changed very fast (at every symbol), the
automatic gain control (AGC) at the eavesdropper’s receiver cannot follow the deep
fades that cause erasures and/or strong signals that cause A/D saturation.
To choose optimum values for A1, A2, and p, note that the following constraints
must be met:
A1
A2
= r and pA21 + (1− p)A22 = 1 (3.5)
Hence, two of these values are constrained by the system parameter r and conservation
of transmission power, and the transmitter is free to choose only one (e.g. p). Thus,
equation (3.4) reduces to:
Rs = max
p
min
pG(.)
Rˆs(pG(.), p) (3.6)
Eve can employ a number of countermeasures to decrease Rs. She can find an op-
timum probability density function that minimizes Rs, or she can employ a better
A/D to decrease erasures and/or overflows of her A/D. In the sequel, we will consider
these scenarios and examine the secrecy rate Rs that can be achieved by the proposed
method in each case.
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3.3 Achievable Secrecy Rates
In this section the secrecy rates that can be achieved considering the non-idealities
of the A/D’s at the front-ends of Bob and Eve’s receivers are studied. In the first
part, the channel between Alice and Bob and the channel between Alice and Eve are
considered to be AWGN channels. In the second part, to get more insight into the
problem, the noise is removed from the channels and only the effect of A/D’s on the
signals will be considered.
3.3.1 Noisy Channels
Consider the derivation of I(X;Y |A = a) − I(X;Z|A = a,G = g). Clearly, each
of h(Y |A = a), h(Y |X,A = a), h(Z|A = a,G = g), and h(Z|X,A = a,G = g) are
required. Since for given gains at Alice and Eve, i.e. A = a and G = g, by substituting
Z with Y and g with a (Figure 3.1), the equations for h(Y |A = a), h(Y |X,A = a)
can be derived from the equations for h(Z|A = a,G = g) and h(Z|X,A = a,G = g),
we just show the calculations for the latter here. In this section all the mutual
information, entropy, and probability density functions are calculated given that A =
a and G = g.
Recall that throughout this work the non-idealities of the A/D’s are modeled by an
additive uniformly distributed quantization noise and a clipping function; hence,the
signal at the output of Eve’s A/D is:
Z =

Z˜ + nq, |Z˜| < l
+l, Z˜ > l
−l, Z˜ < −l
where Z˜ = aX
g
+ nE
g
and l is determined by the range [−l, l] of the A/D. Thus, Z˜
has a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance a
2P+σ2E
g2
, i.e. Z˜ ∼ N (0, a2P+σ2E
g2
).
Let us define the random variable E ′ that takes the values E ′1, E ′2, and E ′3, where
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E ′1 = {|Z˜| < l} is the event that the signal before Eve’s A/D falls in its dynamic
range, and the events E ′2 = {Z˜ > l} and E ′3 = {Z˜ < −l} correspond to clipping
(A/D overflow). We have,
h(Z) = h(Z|E ′) +H(E ′)−H(E ′|Z),
Since E is completely determined by Z, H(E|Z) = 0; thus,
h(Z) =
3∑
i=1
h(Z|E ′i)p(E ′i)−
3∑
i=1
p(E ′i) log(p(E
′
i)).
In the case of clipping we have h(Z|E ′2) = h(Z|E ′3) = 0. The probability that the
A/D is not in overflow is:
p(E ′1) = 1− 2Q
(
gl√
a2P + σ2E
)
,
and the probability that her A/D overflows is given by:
p(E ′2) = p(E
′
3) = Q
(
gl√
a2P + σ2E
)
,
Then, h(Z|E ′1) is calculated as:
fZ|E′1(z) = fZ˜|E′1(z) ∗ fnq(z)
=
1
δ
∫ l
−l
fZ˜(s)U[−δ/2,δ/2](z − s)ds
=
1
δ
∫ min(l,z+δ/2)
max(−l,z−δ/2)
fZ˜(s)ds
≈ 1
δ
∫ z+δ/2
z−δ/2
fZ˜(s)ds
=
1
δ
(
Q
(
g(z − δ/2))√
a2P + σ2E
)
−Q
(
g(z + δ/2)√
a2P + σ2E
))
, |z| < l (3.7)
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where U[−δ/2,δ/2](.) is the rectangle function on [−δ/2, δ/2], i.e. the value of the
function is one on the interval [−δ/2, δ/2] and zero elsewhere. The reason that the
approximation is valid is that we assume high precision A/Ds are applied and thus
δ  l. Hence,
h(Z) =
(
1− 2Q
(
gl√
a2P + σ2E
))∫ l
−l
−fZ|E′1(z) log(fZ|E′1(z))dz +H(E ′). (3.8)
Similarly, for h(Z|X) we have,
h(Z|X) = h(Z|X,E ′) +H(E ′|X)−H(E ′|X,Z)
Since H(E ′|X,Z) = 0,
h(Z|X) =
3∑
i=1
h(Z|E ′i, X)p(E ′i|X) +H(E ′|X) (3.9)
where h(Z|E ′2, X = x) = h(Z|E ′3, X = x) = 0. The probability that Eve’s A/D works
in its dynamic range given X is,
p(E ′1|X = x) = p(|Z˜| < l|X = x)
= p(|ax
g
+
nE
g
| < l)
= p(−(gl + Ax) < nE < gl − Ax))
= Q
(−(gl + Ax)
σE
)
−Q
(
gl − Ax
σE
)
and the probability that her A/D overflows,
p(E ′2|X = x) = p(Z˜ > l|X = x)
= p(
ax
g
+
nE
g
> l)
= Q
(
gl − Ax
σE
)
,
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and,
p(E ′2|X = x) = p(Z˜ < −l|X = x)
= p(
ax
g
+
nE
g
< −l)
= Q
(
gl + Ax
σE
)
.
In order to calculate h(Z|E ′1, X), fZ|E′1,X=x(z) is required. The signal before Eve’s
A/D Z˜ given X = x has a Gaussian distribution with mean Ax/g and variance σ2E/g2
within interval |ax/g + nE/g| < l and zero elsewhere. Hence,
fZ|E′1,X=x(z) = fZ˜|E′1,X=x(z) ∗ fnq(z)
≈ 1
δ
∫ z+δ/2
z−δ/2
fZ˜|X=x(z)ds
=
1
δ
(
Q
(
g(z − δ/2)− Ax
σE
)
−Q
(
g(z + δ/2)− Ax
σE
))
,
for |z| < l, and,
h(Z|X) =∫ ∞
−∞
[ ∫ l
−l
−fZ|E′1,X=x(z) log(fZ|E′1,X=x(z))dz p(E ′1|X = x)
−
3∑
i=1
p(E ′i|X = x) log(p(E ′i|X = x))
]
fX(x)dx (3.10)
By substituting h(Z) from (3.8) and h(Z|X) from (3.10) in the following equation,
I(X;Z) = h(Z)− h(Z|X), (3.11)
the mutual information between Alice and Eve given A = a and G = g, can be found.
Also, by substituting Z with Y , σ2E with σ2B, and g with a in (3.8), (3.10), and (3.11),
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the mutual information between Alice and Bob given A = a can be found,
I(X;Y ) = h(Y )− h(Y |X) (3.12)
The achievable secrecy rate can be found by substituting these mutual informations
into the following equation:
Rs = EG,A [I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)] (3.13)
Alice is able to choose p to maximize the Rs that can be achieved by this method;
on the other side, Eve tries to minimize Rs by choosing an appropriate pG(.). The
following lemma shows that for an arbitrary discrete alphabet for G, choosing a single
value (which depends on the value of p) with probability one minimizes the secrecy
rate, and thus is the optimal strategy for Eve.
Lemma 3.1. The gain 1/G that Eve applies before her A/D should take a single
value with probability one to minimize the secrecy rate.
Proof. Suppose G has the following probability mass function:
pG(g = Gi) = αi, i = 1, · · · , n
such that
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. Without loss of generality, assume that for a specific p, the
maximum information leakage occurs at G = G1, i.e. for any gain Gi, i = 2, · · · , n
we have I(X;Z|G = G1) ≥ I(X;Z|G = Gi); hence,
I(X;Z) =
n∑
i=1
αiI(X;Z|G = Gi)
≤
n∑
i=1
αiI(X;Z|G = G1) = I(X;Z|G = G1)
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The above lemma can easily be generalized to continuous random variables. Nu-
merical results are given in Sections 3.4 and 3.4.5.
3.3.2 Noiseless Channels
In the case that the channel between Alice and Eve is noiseless, h(Z) can be
found by setting σ2E = 0 in (3.8). Using (3.10) and the fact that h(Z|E ′2, X = x) =
h(Z|E ′3, X = x) = 0 and H(E ′|X) = 0 we have,
h(Z|X)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(Z|E ′1, X = x)p(E ′1|X = x)fX(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(
aX
g
+ nq|E ′1, X = x)p(E ′1|X = x)fX(x)dx
=
∫ gl/|A|
−Gl/|A|
h(nq)fX(x)dx
= log(δ)
(
1− 2Q
(
gl
a
√
P
))
(3.14)
Similarly, in the case that Bob has a noiseless channel,
h(Y |X) = log(δ)
(
1− 2Q
(
l√
P
))
(3.15)
In each case, the secrecy rate can be found by substituting (3.14) and (3.15) in
(3.11) and (3.12), respectively. Numerical results for the noiseless channels are shown
in Sections 3.4 and 3.4.5.
Clearly, considering noiseless channels makes the results less complicated and thus
more insightful. Hence, we continue our investigation by studying the asymptotic
behavior of the proposed method (as r →∞) in the noiseless regime, which will help
us to achieve some intuition regarding this scheme. We assume that Bob and Eve use
A/D’s of the same quality for this analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Gaussian erasure wiretap channel: in the asymptotic case, the era-
sures/overflows at Eve’s A/D due to the rapid power modulation at the transmitter
can be modeled by an erasure channel.
Since in the noiseless regime I(X;Y ) does not depend on A, it does not change
with r and thus we need only evaluate I(X;Z) for our asymptotic analysis.
From (B.9) we have,
A1 =
r√
pr2 + (1− p) and A2 =
1√
pr2 + (1− p) (3.16)
Let G(r) be the inverse of the gain that Eve employs as a function of r. Recall from
Lemma 1 that G(r) will take a single value with probability one for a given r, but
that value can depend on r. Since A1 → 1/√p and A2 → 0, we claim that in the limit
(as r → ∞), the best strategy that Eve can take is to choose either G(r) = Θ(1) or
G(r) = Θ(r−1); otherwise, she will get no information (see Appendix A).
First we study the secrecy rates that can be achieved when G(r) = Θ(1) as r
approaches ∞. The average secrecy rate is:
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Rs = E[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]
= p(I(X;Y |A = A1)− I(X;Z|A = A1))
+ (1− p)(I(X;Y |A = A2)− I(X;Z|A = A2)) (3.17)
Assuming that Bob chooses the optimum range for his A/D, the maximum I(X;Z|A =
A1) that Eve can achieve is I(X;Y |A = A1) and hence the first term in (3.17) is zero.
To evaluate the second term, putting G(r) and A = A2 in (3.8) and (3.14) yields:
h(Z) =
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A2
√
P
))
∫ a
−a
−fZ|E′1(z) log(fZ|E′1(z))dz +H(E ′) (3.18)
where since G(r) = Θ(1),
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A2
√
P
))
→ 1 as r → ∞ and thus H(E ′) → 0;
and, for |z| < l,
fZ|E′1(z)
=
1
δ
(
Q
(
G(r)(z − δ/2)
A2
√
P
)
−Q
(
G(r)(z + δ/2)
A2
√
P
))
→

1
δ
, 0 < |z| < δ/2
1
2δ
, |z| = δ/2
0, otherwise
Since the integrand in (3.18) is bounded for all r, from the dominated convergence
theorem, h(Z)→ log δ as r →∞. Also since G(r) = Θ(1),
h(Z|X) = log(δ)
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A2
√
P
))
→ log(δ) (3.19)
as r approaches ∞. Thus, I(X;Z|A = A2) = 0 and hence the average secrecy rate
given that G(r) = Θ(1) is Rs = (1− p)I(X;Y ).
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Now suppose G(r) = Θ(r−1) and consider the second term in (3.17). In the
limit, A2/G(r) = c where c > 0 is a bounded constant. Since Bob chooses the
optimum range for his A/D, the maximum I(X;Z|A = A2) that Eve can achieve is
I(X;Y |A = A2) and thus given that G(r) = Θ(r−1), the second term in (3.17) is zero.
To evaluate the first term in (3.17) as r gets large, by substituting G(r) = Θ(r−1)
and A = A1 in (3.8) and (3.14), we have fZ|E′1(z)→ 0 and,
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))
→ 0
as r approaches infinity and hence h(Z)→ 0. Also by letting G(r) = Θ(r−1) we have,
h(Z|X) = log(δ)
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))
→ 0 as r →∞
Hence, with probability p the mutual information between Alice and Eve is zero and
the average secrecy rate that can be achieved given G(r) = Θ(r−1) as r approaches
∞ is Rs = pI(X;Y ).
We can interpret these results as follows; when A/G(r) = A1/Θ(r−1), the total
gain that Eve’s A/D sees approaches infinity as r → ∞; hence, even if Eve uses an
A/D with larger range than Bob’s A/D, her quantizer overflows. When A/G(r) =
A2/Θ(1), the total gain goes to zero as r approaches infinity and thus even if Eve
uses an A/D with better precision, the received signal amplitude is less than one
quantization level. In both cases, Eve receives no information about the transmitted
signal and thus Eve’s channel can be modeled by an erasure channel (Figure 3.2),
where for G(r) = Θ(r−1), the probability of erasure  = 1 − p and for G(r) = Θ(1),
 = p.
Hence, the secrecy rate that can be achieved in the asymptotic case (as r → ∞)
is:
Rs = (1− )I(X;Y ) (3.20)
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Figure 3.3: Achievable secrecy rate versus r (the ratio between the large and the small
gain); both Bob and Eve apply 10-bit A/D’s with the dynamic range l = 2.5. The
SNRs of both Bob’s channel and Eve’s channel are the same and are denoted by α.
To maximize the achievable secrecy rate, it is reasonable for Alice to choose
p = 0.5. In Section 3.4.2 it is shown that for a 10-bit A/D and transmitter power
P = 1, the optimum range of the A/D is obtained by setting l = 2.5, and the cor-
responding mutual information between Alice and Bob (when the channel between
them is noiseless) is I(X;Y ) = 6.597. Hence, using (3.20), Rs → 0.5×6.597 = 3.2985.
Figure 3.3 (the upper curve) shows the achievable secrecy rate versus r when both
Bob’s channel and Eve’s channel are noiseless. It can be seen that as r gets larger,
the achievable secrecy rate goes to a constant which is similar to what is anticipated.
Furthermore, for larger r’s (r ≥ 103) the optimum probability that maximizes the
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worst case secrecy rate is p = 0.5. These results show that our results are consistent
to expectations in the limit.
From another point of view, consider that for small values of δ, the quantization
noise can be modeled by a zero mean Gaussian random variable with the variance
δ2/12, where δ is the size of each quantization level. Thus, this wiretap channel can
be modeled by a Gaussian erasure wiretap channel.
The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is [3]:
Cs =
1
2
(
log(1 + |hB|2γB)− log(1 + |hE|2γE)
)+
where hB and hE are channel gains, γB is the SNR at Bob’s receiver, and γE is the
SNR at Eve’s receiver. We can use this secrecy capacity in our asymptotic model by
setting hB = 1 and modeling the erasure channel by an unusual fading channel with
the following fading distribution:
hE =
 0, w.p. 1, w.p. 1− 
Since we assumed that Eve’s A/D is identical to Bob’s A/D, γE = γB = Pδ2/12 and
thus the secrecy capacity is non-zero only when an erasure at Eve’s channel occurs.
Hence,
Cs =
(1− )
2
log(1 + γB) (3.21)
This equation shows that for a 10-bit A/D with l = 2.5, transmitting power P = 1,
and  = p = 0.5, the secrecy capacity is Cs = 3.2822 which is again very close to
what we expect from our asymptotic analysis. Furthermore, on comparing equations
(3.20) and (3.21), it is seen that in the asymptotic case, the achievable secrecy rate
meets this approximate secrecy capacity.
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Figure 3.4: Secrecy capacity of public discussion for various values of SNR at Bob’s
receiver when the SNR at Eve’s receiver changes from 50 dB to 100 dB and P = 1.
When the SNR at Bob’s receiver is less than the SNR Eve’s receiver, the secrecy rate
drops rapidly.
3.4 Numerical Results
3.4.1 Motivation
When the channel between Alice and Eve is less noisy than the channel between
Alice and Bob, if the legitimate users are restricted to one-way and rate-limited
communication, the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is zero. However, if
we relax the restrictions placed on the schemes that the legitimate users can apply
by allowing two-way communication and the presence of a noiseless, public, and
authenticated channel, public discussion strategies [55, 1] allow the legitimate nodes
to agree on a secret key by extracting information from realizations of correlated
random variables. This secret-key can then be used in a one-time-pad for secret
communication between Alice and Bob. A closed form for the general secret-key
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capacity is not available; however, in the case of a Gaussian source model in which
X ∼ N (0, P ) and a Gaussian wiretap channel, i.e. when the channel between Alice
and Bob and the channel between Alice and Eve are AWGN channels, the secrecy
capacity has a simple form [7, Chapter 5]:
CSMs =
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pσ2E
(P + σ2E)σ
2
B
)
(3.22)
and thus all secret-key rates less than CSMs are achievable. Achievable secrecy rates of
public discussion for various values of the signal-to-noise ratio at Bob’s receiver versus
signal-to-noise ratio at Eve’s receiver are shown in Figure 3.4. As can be seen, when
the SNR of Eve’s receiver is significantly larger than the SNR at Bob’s receiver, the
secrecy rate of public discussion drops rapidly. Our main goal here is to see whether
our scheme can improve the performance in this regime.
3.4.2 Noiseless Channels: Eve with the same A/D as Bob
We begin our investigation by considering only the effect of A/D’s on the signals.
Hence, we assume that Eve’s channel is noiseless, i.e. nE = 0 (which benefits the
eavesdropper). However, we also assume the system nodes are working in a very high
SNR regime and thus the channel noise at Bob can be neglected (nB = 0).
Now suppose that both Bob and Eve use 10-bit quantizers (b = 210) and the
transmitter power is P = 1. Since δ = 2a/b, for a fixed number of quantization bits,
I(X;Y ) is a function of the of the A/D (a), and the optimal quantization range that
maximizes I(X;Y ) can be found. Since I(X;Y ) is an intricate function in terms
of a, we find the optimum a numerically. In this case, the optimum quantization
range that maximizes I(X;Y ) is l = 2.5, and the corresponding mutual information
between Alice and Bob is I(X;Y ) = 6.597. For the remainder of the work, we use
l = 2.5 in our calculations. Suppose that Eve has the same A/D as Bob. From
Lemma 1, putting a random gain is undesirable for Eve; hence, she chooses a fixed
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Figure 3.5: Achievable secrecy rate vs. the probability p and the gain G at Eve’s
receiver. Both Bob’s and Eve’s channels are noiseless and they use identical 10-bit
A/D’s. The ratio between the two power levels at the transmitter is r = 103 (i.e. 30
dB) and the average transmitting power is P = 1. A maxi-min rate of Rs = 3.1372
is achieved.
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gain G that minimizes Rs. Because Alice is not aware of Eve’s choice, she has to
choose a probability p that maximizes the worst case Rs.
As we discussed in Section 3.2, a larger r leads to more eavesdropper confusion
and thus as r increases, the secrecy rate would be expected to increase. However, in
the case of noisy channels, a large r also causes noise enhancement at Bob’s receiver
that decreases the secrecy rate. In order to get some insight about the dependency of
the secrecy rate on r, curves of Rs versus r are shown in Figure 3.3. For each curve,
the SNR at both Eve’s receiver and Bob’s receiver are the same and are denoted by α.
Hence, in order to achieve high secrecy rates by avoiding excessive noise enhancement
at Bob’s receiver, for the rest of the chapter we set r = 103. The plot of Rs versus
p and G for P = 1 and r = 103 (i.e. 30 dB) where both Bob and Eve are each
using a 10-bit A/D is shown in Figure 3.5. This function is complicated and hence
the optimum value of p cannot be derived analytically. Numerical analysis shows
that p ≈ 0.45 maximizes the worst case Rs, and the maxi-min value is Rs = 3.1366.
Hence, choosing p = 0.45 guarantees that at least the secrecy rate Rs = 3.1366 can
be achieved.
3.4.3 Noiseless Channels: Eve with a Better A/D than Bob
Now suppose that Eve has access to a better A/D than Bob. Depending on the
gain that Eve applies before her A/D, a better A/D results in less erasures and/or
less A/D overflows. Hence, the mutual information between Alice and Eve increases
and consequently, the achievable secrecy rate decreases. Figure 3.6 shows this effect
versus p and G. It can be seen that even if Eve uses an A/D which is 24 dB (4
bits) better than Bob’s A/D (Eve has a 14-bit A/D while Bob has a 10-bit A/D), by
choosing an appropriate value for p, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved. In this
example, by choosing p = 0.4, a secrecy rate Rs = 1.2426 is achievable. Even if we
do not change the probability p from the previous section (p = 0.45), assuming that
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Figure 3.6: Achievable secrecy rate vs. the probability p and the gain at Eve’s receiver,
G for the case of noiseless channels. The ratio between the two power levels at the
transmitter is r = 103 (i.e. 30 dB) and the average transmitting power is P = 1. In
the upper curve, both Bob and Eve have the same 10-bit A/D’s. In the lower curve,
Bob uses a 10-bit A/D while Eve uses a 14-bit A/D (Eve’s A/D is 24 dB better than
Bob’s A/D) and a maxi-min rate of Rs = 1.2478 is achieved (for p = 0.4).
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Alice is not aware of Eve’s better A/D, a secrecy rate Rs = 0.9225 is achievable. In
spite of having a better A/D, Eve will still lose some symbols and hence a positive
secrecy rate is available. This is because the ratio between the large and the small
gain, A1 and A2, is 103, while Eve’s A/D has only 16 times better resolution; thus,
she still needs to compromise between resolution and overflow. To cancel the effect of
these gains completely, Eve has to use an A/D that has an effective resolution after
taking into account jamming, interference, etc. on the order of 103 times (10 bits)
better than Bob’s A/D, which would be very difficult in an adversarial environment.
3.4.4 Noisy Main Channel, Noiseless Eavesdropper’s channel
Now we look at the extreme case that Eve is able to receive exactly what Alice
transmits and receives (e.g. the adversary is able to pick up the transmitter’s radio
and hook directly to the antenna), but the channel between Alice and Bob is noisy
and hence no other technique is effective. In other words, the channel between Alice
and Bob experiences an additive white Gaussian noise (nB ∼ N (0, σ2B)), while Eve’s
channel is noiseless (nE = 0). Figure 3.7 shows the secrecy rate Rs that can be
achieved using the proposed scheme versus the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob’s
receiver. In this case, the transmitted power P = 1, the ratio between the large
and the small gain is 30 dB, and both Bob and Eve use 10-bit A/D’s. It can be
seen that, although Eve’s channel is much better than Bob’s channel, when the SNR
at Bob’s receiver is greater than 60 dB, which could be made common in a short-
range application as described in Section 3.1, a positive secrecy rate is available. By
comparing the noise-free result in Figure 3.3 for r = 103 and Figure 3.7, it can be
seen that the secrecy rate when SNR at Bob is 120 dB is still less than the secrecy
rate when Bob’s channel is noiseless.
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Figure 3.7: Achievable secrecy rate vs. SNR at Bob’s receiver while the SNR at Eve’s
receiver is infinity (Eve has perfect access to the transmitted signal) for r = 103, P = 1
and Bob and Eve applying 10-bit A/D’s. Note that the assumption of Eve having a
noiseless channel is the extreme case when Eve has perfect access to the transmitter’s
output (for instance, the eavesdropper is able to pick up the transmitter’s radio) and
hence other secrecy methods are not effective. Using the proposed method, a positive
secrecy rate can be achieved over short range at reasonable power.
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3.4.5 Noisy Channels
When both channels are noisy, the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed method
versus the SNR at Eve’s receiver for various values of the SNR at Bob’s receiver is
shown in Figures 3.8. The transmitted power P = 1, the ratio between the large and
the small gain is 30 dB, and both Bob and Eve use 10-bit A/D’s. It can be seen that
by applying the proposed method for the case of Eve with a (significantly) better
channel than Bob, which is the regime of interest per Figure 3.4, reasonable secrecy
rates can be achieved. Note that in our method we are generating an advantage for the
legitimate nodes to be used with wiretap coding, and thus, because public discussion
approaches assume the presence of a public authenticated channel, public discussion
should not be viewed as a competitor to the proposed scheme. Rather, if such a public
authenticated channel exists and two-way communication is possible, our method can
be used in conjunction with public discussion techniques to result in higher secrecy
rates. Nevertheless, per Figure 3.4, public discussion provides motivation for the
regime where advances are needed given the current state of the art.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce a new approach that exploits a short-term crypto-
graphic key to force different orderings at Bob and Eve of two operators, one of which
is necessarily non-linear, to obtain the desired advantage for information-theoretic se-
curity in a wireless communication system regardless of the location of Eve. We then
investigate a simple power modulation instantiation of the approach. It is shown that
when Eve’s channel condition is significantly better than the Bob’s channel, reason-
able secrecy rates can still be achieved using our proposed method in this challenging
regime. In particular, even in the case that the adversary is able to pick up the
transmitter’s radio (i.e. Eve has perfect access to the output of the transmitter), a
reasonable secrecy rate is achievable at high SNRs which might apply to a short-range
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Figure 3.8: Achievable secrecy rates for various values of the SNR at Bob’s receiver
when the SNR at Eve’s receiver changes from 50 dB to 100 dB. The settings are
r = 103, P = 1, and Bob and Eve are applying 10-bit A/D’s. When the SNR of the
channel between Alice and Eve is significantly better than the SNR of the channel
between Alice and Bob, reasonable secrecy rates are still achievable.
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wireless system. For example, one might use the transmission power of typical cellu-
lar systems with the corresponding excess power at short ranges to establish a secure
radio system in a limited area.
Although we have considered the case of Eve with a better A/D than Bob, the
clear risk to the approach is still that of asymmetric capabilities at the receivers. For
example, if we employ the simple power modulation approach studied extensively
here, Eve may employ multiple A/D’s with different gain settings in front of each.
Hence, Eve would be able to record two signals independently and decode them
later when she gets the key or extracts the key based on the pattern of erasures
and overflows at each A/D. A simple approach to combat this attack is rather than
applying just two power levels, the transmitter can apply many power levels. More
promising, however, is to consider adding memory to the signal warping process [72].
Broadly considering potential techniques for everlasting security in wireless sys-
tems, including that proposed here, yields that each approach still holds some risk. In
the case of cryptographic security, assumptions must be made on both the hardness
of the problem and the current/future computational capabilities of the adversary.
In the case of standard information-theoretic security, assumptions must be made
on the quality of the channel to Eve, generally corresponding to limitations on her
location. In the method proposed here, assumptions must be made on Eve’s current
conversion hardware capabilities, but, as in standard information-theoretic secrecy,
there is no assumption on future capabilities. All three approaches thus have different
applicability.
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CHAPTER 4
JAMMING BASED ON AN EPHEMERAL KEY TO
OBTAIN EVERLASTING SECURITY IN WIRELESS
ENVIRONMENTS
In this chapter we consider secure communication over a wiretap channel in a dis-
advantaged wireless environment, where the eavesdropper channel is (possibly much)
better than the main channel. We present a method to exploit inherent vulnerabilities
of the eavesdroppers receiver to obtain everlasting secrecy. Based on an ephemeral
cryptographic key pre-shared between the transmitter Alice and the intended recip-
ient Bob, a random jamming signal is added to each symbol. Bob can subtract the
jamming signal before recording the signal, while the eavesdropper Eve is forced to
perform these non-commutative operations in the opposite order. Thus, information-
theoretic secrecy can be obtained, hence achieving the goal of converting the vul-
nerable "cheap" cryptographic secret key bits into "valuable" information-theoretic
(i.e. everlasting) secure bits. We evaluate the achievable secrecy rates for different
settings, and show that, even when the eavesdropper has perfect access to the out-
put of the transmitter (albeit through an imperfect analog-to-digital converter), the
method can still achieve a positive secrecy rate. Next we consider a wideband system,
where Alice and Bob perform frequency hopping in addition to adding the random
jamming to the signal, and we show the utility of such an approach even in the face
of substantial eavesdropper hardware capabilities.
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4.1 Introduction
The usual approach to provide secrecy is encryption of the message. Such cryp-
tographic approaches rely on the assumption that the eavesdropper does not have
access to the key, and the computational capabilities of the eavesdropper are limited
[79]. However, if the eavesdropper can somehow obtain the key in the future, or the
cryptographic system is broken, the secret message can be obtained from the recorded
clean cipher [5], which is not acceptable in many applications requiring everlasting
secrecy.
The desire for everlasting security motivates considering information-theoretic se-
curity methods, where the eavesdropper is unable to extract any information about
the message from the received signal. Wyner showed that, for a discrete memoryless
wiretap channel, if the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded with respect to the main
channel, adding randomness to the codebook allows a positive secrecy rate to be
achieved [85]. This idea was extended to the more general case of a wiretap channel
with a “more noisy” or “less capable” eavesdropper [16]. Hence, in order to obtain a
positive secrecy rate in a one-way communication system, it is essential for the main
channel to have an advantage with respect to the eavesdropper’s channel. However,
in wireless systems, guaranteeing such an advantage is not always possible, as an
eavesdropper close to the transmitter or having a directional antenna can obtain a
very high signal-to-noise ratio. Furthermore, the location and channel state informa-
tion of a passive eavesdropper is usually not known to the legitimate nodes, making
it difficult to pick the secrecy rate to employ. Recently, approaches based on the
cooperative jamming scheme of [57] and [30], which try to build an advantage for
the legitimate nodes over the eavesdropper, have been considered extensively in the
literature [47, 31, 33, 19, 34, 59]. However, these approaches require either multiple
antennas, helper nodes, and/or fading and therefore are not robust across all op-
erating environments envisioned for wireless networks. Other approaches to obtain
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information-theoretic security when such an advantage does not exist are schemes
based on “public discussion” [55], which utilize two-way communication channels and
a public authenticated channel. However, public discussion schemes result in low se-
crecy rates in scenarios of interest (as discussed in detail in [73]), and the technique
proposed here can be used in conjunction with public discussion approaches when
two-way communication is possible.
In this work, we exploit current hardware limitations of the eavesdropper to
achieve everlasting security. Prior work in this area includes the “bounded storage
model” of Cachin and Maurer [10]. However, it is difficult to plan on memory size
limitations at the eavesdropper, since not only do memories improve rapidly as de-
scribed by the well-known Moore’s Law [45], but they also can be stacked arbitrarily
subject only to (very) large space limitations. Our approach, first presented in [71]
and further developed in [73], rather than exploiting limitations of the memory in the
receiver back-end, exploits limitations in the analog-to-digital converter (A/D) at the
receiver front-end, where the technology progresses slowly, and unlike memory, stack-
ing cannot be done arbitrarily due to jitter considerations. Also, from a long-term
perspective, there is a fundamental bound on the ability to perform A/D conversion
[83], with some authors postulating that current technology is close to that limit
[43, 44]. Hence, we exploit the receiver analog-to-digital conversion processing effect
on the received signal to obtain everlasting security. A rapid random power modula-
tion instance of this approach was investigated in [73] and [71], where the transmitter
Alice modulates the signal by two vastly different power levels. The intended recipi-
ent Bob, since he knows the key, can adapt to the power modulation before his A/D,
while the eavesdropper Eve fails to do such and, for a restricted set of attacker modes,
information-theoretic security is obtained. However, the power modulation scheme
is susceptible to being broken by an eavesdropper with a more sophisticated receiver
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than that assumed in [73], as discussed in [73] and shown explicitly here in Section
4.2.
Instead, here we consider a different method to obtain everlasting secrecy. First,
recall that, at moderate-to-high signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs), increasing the transmit
power leads to very small gains in the secrecy rate, as it makes the received signal
not only stronger at Bob, but also at Eve. So, consider using excess power in a
different manner. Suppose that Alice employs her cryptographically-secure key bits
to select a jamming signal to add to the transmitted signal. Since Bob knows the
key, he can cancel the jamming signal before his A/D; on the other hand, Eve must
store the signal and try to cancel the jamming signal from the recorded signal at
the output of her A/D after she obtains the key1. However, the jamming signal is
designed such that Eve has already lost the information she would need to recover
the secret message, even if she obtains the key immediately after the transmission. In
particular, we present numerical results to investigate the number of cryptographic
key bits needed to obtain positive secrecy rates and demonstrate the secrecy rates
that can be obtained in disadvantaged environments.
Next, we consider a wideband system that additionally employs spread-spectrum
in the form of frequency hopping to further enhance everlasting secrecy. At first
glance, one might think that the eavesdropper can easily thwart such an enhance-
ment by utilizing a wideband receiver that can process all of the frequencies that
the transmitter uses. However, because of the limitations in the aperture jitter of
A/Ds, the implementation of an A/D with both a high sampling frequency and high
resolution is not feasible. Thus, Eve faces a difficult tradeoff. If Eve employs a high
resolution A/D, she will lose any information outside her bandwidth. On the other
hand, if she employs an A/D with large bandwidth, the resolution of her A/D will
1Recall that the storage of an analog signal, which is equivalent to an analog delay line, is one of
the greatest and longstanding challenges of analog signal processing.
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Figure 4.1: Wiretap channel with receiver analog-to-digital (A/D) converters shown.
be lower, making her receiver vulnerable to the random jamming employed by Alice,
per above.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the system
model and the difficult challenges faced. The random jamming approach for secrecy,
its analysis and numerical results for the narrowband case are presented in Section
4.3. In Section 4.4, wideband systems are considered. The method of Section 4.4
is discussed in Section 4.5. Conclusions and ideas for future work are presented in
Section 4.6.
4.2 System Model
4.2.1 System Model
We consider a wiretap channel, which consists of a transmitter, Alice, a legitimate
receiver, Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve. The eavesdropper is assumed to be passive,
i.e. it does not attempt to actively prevent (e.g. via jamming) the legitimate nodes
to receive the message. Thus, the location and channel state information of the
eavesdropper is assumed to be unknown to the legitimate nodes.
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We assume that either a very short initial key is pre-shared between Alice and
Bob, or they share an initial cryptographic key using a key agreement method like
Diffie-Hellman [64] (through four phases of public communication). By employing a
cryptographic stream-cipher generation method, this initial key is used to obtain a
long key sequence. Several methods to generate secure stream-ciphers are available.
For instance, a secure cryptographic scheme like AES with 128 bits of initial key can
be used in the counter mode to generate 238 bits of stream-cipher [58, Chapter 5].
Since we are using cryptographic approaches to perform key expansion and perhaps
to exchange an initial key, we should assume that the computational power of Eve
during message transmission is not unlimited. However, unlike cryptography, our
system design is such that the key is only employed ephemerally, and thus even if
(pessimistically) the full key is handed to Eve after completion of transmission, she
can not obtain enough information to recover the message. Hence, our method is not
vulnerable to threats against cryptographic schemes, like future key leakage or future
advances in the computational power of Eve.
We consider a one-way communication system with an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel between Alice and each of Bob and Eve, and we include
variations of the path-loss in the noise variance. Hence, the signal that Bob receives
is:
Yˆ = X + nB,
where X denotes the current code symbol, and nB is the noise of Bob’s channel,
nB ∼ N (0, σ2B). The signal that Eve receives is:
Zˆ = X + nE,
where nE ∼ N (0, σ2E) is the noise of Eve’s channel (Figure 4.1). We consider line-of-
sight communication; however, the scheme works similarly on fading channels with a
different calculation for the secrecy rate.
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The effect of the A/D on the received signal (quantization error) is modeled by
both a quantization noise, which is due to the limitation in the size of each quanti-
zation level, and missed symbols due to the quantizer’s overflow. The quantization
noise in this case is (approximately) uniformly distributed [84, Section 5], so we will
assume it is uniformly distributed throughout the chapter. For a b-bit quantizer (2b
gray levels) over the full dynamic range [−r, r], two adjacent quantization levels are
spaced by δ = 2r/2b, and thus the quantization noise is uniformly distributed over
an interval of length δ. Throughout this chapter, the quantization noise of Bob’s
A/D is denoted by nqB, and the quantization noise of Eve’s A/D is denoted by nqE.
Quantizer overflow happens when the amplitude of the received signal is greater than
the quantizer’s dynamic range. We assume that Alice knows an upper bound on
Eve’s current A/D conversion ability (without any assumption on Eve’s future A/D
conversion capabilities).
For a stationary memoryless wiretap channel any secrecy rate,
Rs < max
X→Y Z
[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)] (4.1)
is achievable [8]. We assume that X is taken from a standard Gaussian codebook
where each entry has variance P , i.e. X ∼ N (0, P ). While using the Gaussian
codebook is optimal for AWGN channels, it is not optimal in our model as we consider
the quantization errors (the uniformly distributed quantization noise and overflows);
hence, our results indicate achievable rates but not upper bounds.
4.2.2 Power Modulation Approach [73, 71]
Our goal is to use the cheap (and numerous) cryptographically secure bits of the
key stream in Section 4.2.1 to obtain “expensive” information-theoretic secret bits
at the legitimate receiver. As a first step, in [73, 71], we considered a rapid power
modulation instance of this approach, where the transmitted signal is modulated by
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Figure 4.2: Eve with a sophisticated receiver. To break the power modulation ap-
proach of [73] and [71], she can record Z1 and Z2 and decode them later - when she
obtains the key, the encryption system is broken, or she has access to an unlimited
computational power - to obtain the secret message.
two vastly different power levels A1 and A2 at the transmitter. Since Bob knows the
key, he can undo the effect of the power modulation before his A/D, putting his signal
in the appropriate range for analog-to-digital conversion, while Eve must compromise
between larger quantization noise and more A/D overflows. Consequently, she will
lose information she needs to recover the message, and information-theoretic security
is obtained. However, a clear risk of the approach of [71, 73] is a sophisticated
eavesdropper with multiple A/Ds. Suppose that Eve has two A/Ds, and she uses
them in parallel with a gain in front of each A/D such that each gain cancels the
effect of one of the gains that Alice uses to modulate the secret message; thus, she
records Z1 and Z2 as shown in Figure 4.2. Even if Eve does not know A1 and A2, it is
easy for her to estimate A1 and A2 during transmission from the received signal. For
example, Eve can use a random small gain and a random large gain. With the small
gain, she tracks symbols for which her A/D overflows and finds the optimum small
gain, and with the large gain, she tracks symbols with small amplitude and finds the
optimum large gain. After completion of the transmission, if Eve obtains the key as
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we assume, she can use it to retain for each channel use only the element of {Z1, Z2}
from the branch of her receiver properly matched to the transmission gain. In the
disadvantaged wireless scenario, Eve’s recorded signal then contains more information
than Bob’s about the transmitted message from Alice, and thus the desired everlasting
secrecy is compromised. This problem seems to be resolvable by using many gains
instead of just two gains, as posited in [73]. However, the signal X is Gaussian
distributed and thus the amplitude of the signal, regardless of gain, is concentrated
around zero. This gives Eve an advantage in designing the quantization levels of her
A/D versus the scheme proposed here, and, pragmatically, makes the specification of
Eve’s optimal A/D and thus the achievable rate of such a scheme intractable. Since
our goal is to design a scheme that is provably secure, this latter deficiency should
not be underrated. In the next section, a new approach to utilize the key bits to
obtain everlasting secrecy in the case of an eavesdropper with sophisticated hardware
is presented.
4.3 Random Jamming for Secrecy
In this chapter, we propose adding random jamming with large variation to the sig-
nal to obtain secrecy (Figure 4.3). Suppose that Alice employs her cryptographically-
secure key bits to select a signal from a uniform discrete distribution to add to the
transmitted signal. Now, since Bob knows the key, he can simply subtract off the
jamming signal and continue normal decoding with an A/D converter well-matched
to the span of the signal. However, Eve does not have knowledge of the key and thus
has difficulty matching the span of her A/D to the received signal. If she does not
change the span of her A/D, she will lose information due to overflows. On the other
hand, if she increases the span of her A/D to contain all of the received signal, the
width of each quantization level will increase and thus she will lose information due
to higher quantization noise. As before, we assume that the key is handed to Eve
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Figure 4.3: Bob and Eve both receive the superposition of the message and the random
jamming signal. Bob uses the key sequence to cancel the effect of the jammer on his
signal before the analog-to-digital conversion, while Eve has to wait to obtain the key
after completion of transmission and cancel the effect of the jammer after her A/D.
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as soon as transmission is complete, and obviously Eve could simply subtract the
jamming signal off of her recorded samples in memory. But, as before, a nonlinear
operation (the analog-to-digital converter) has processed the signal, hence allowing
the possibility of information-theoretic secrecy even when the secret key is handed
to Eve immediately after the transmission.2 Indeed, with her poorly matched A/D,
Eve will not have recorded a reasonable version of the signal and we will see that
information-theoretic security can be obtained. In this case, one countermeasure for
Eve would be to employ parallel receiver branches, each with a different fixed voltage
offset; however, this is precisely a higher-resolution A/D over a larger span and thus
is captured by the standard A/D model and technology trend lines. In this chap-
ter, we will show that, through such a scheme, “cheap” cryptographically-secure key
bits can be used to greatly increase the transmission rate of the desired “expensive”
information-theoretic secure bits.
4.3.1 Analysis
Suppose that Eve has a be bit A/D and she sets the span of the A/D to 2lσ to
cover [−lσ, lσ], where l is a constant that maximizes I(X;Z), and σ = √P is the
standard deviation of the transmitted signal X. Now, suppose that Alice adds a
random jamming signal J to X based on the pre-shared key between Alice and Bob
(Figure 4.3). In particular, J follows a discrete uniform distribution with 2k levels
between −c and c, where k is the number of key bits per jamming symbol, and c
(maximum amplitude of the jamming signal) is an arbitrary constant. In order to
maximize the degradation of Eve’s A/D, Alice should maximize c. Thus, given that
k key bits per jamming symbol is available at Alice, the relationship between k and
2We put the previous phrase in italics so that the reader does not confuse the proposed approach
with a number of schemes in the information-theoretic secrecy literature that look similar, but must
presume that the key (or secret) on which the jamming sequence is based is kept secret from Eve
forever.
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c is:
(2k − 1)× 2lσ = 2c.
On the other hand, Eve, in order to maximize I(X;Z), expands the span of her A/D
to 2nlσ, where n = 2m is an arbitrary constant that maximizes I(X;Z). Hence, the
new resolution of Eve’s A/D will be
δ′e =
2lσn
2be
=
2lσ
2be−m
.
Since the jamming signal is uniformly distributed, if Eve does not change the span of
her A/D, she will miss a fraction 2k−2m
2k
of the information due to her A/D overflows,
and will gain only a fraction 2m
2k
of the information. The best strategy for Eve is to
choose a m that maximizes the mutual information between X and Z. When the
channel between Alice and Eve is noiseless, by using the approach of [15, Pg. 251]
for analyzing high resolution quantizers (δ′E  1),
I(X;Z) =
2m
2k
(H(Z)−H(Z|X))
≈ 2
m
2k
(
h(Zˆ)− log(δ′E)
)
=
2m
2k
(
h(X)− log
(
2lσ
2be−m
))
=
2m
2k
(
log
(
σ
√
2pie
)
− log(2lσ) + be −m
)
=
2m
2k
(
log
(√
pie
2l2
)
+ be −m
)
From [73] the optimum value for l is l = 2.5. Hence, for m < be − 1.2, I(X : Z) is
strictly increasing inm and thus the maximum mutual information between Alice and
Eve is obtained when m is maximum, i.e. m = k. This means that the best strategy
for Eve is to enlarge the span of her A/D to avoid overflows. In the numerical results
section we will show that m = k maximizes I(X;Z) even when δ′E is not very small.
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Hence, in the remainder of this section, we assume the dynamic range of Eve’s A/D
is 2k+1lσ, and thus no A/D overflow happens.
Now, we calculate the exact achievable secrecy rate. From (4.1), in order to
calculate the achievable secrecy rates, I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z) are needed. We only
show the calculations for the latter here, as I(X;Y ) can be obtained in a similar way.
The mutual information between X and Z can be written as,
I(X;Z) = h(Z)− h(Z|X)
=
∫ lσ
−lσ
−fZ(z) log(fZ(z))dz
−
∫ ∞
−∞
fX(x)
∫ lσ
−lσ
−fZ|X=x(z) log(fZ|X=x(z))dzdx, (4.2)
Hence, we need to calculate the probability density functions (pdf) of Z and Z|X = x.
The signal at the input of Eve’s receiver is Zˆ = J+X+nE. Suppose that after analog-
to-digital conversion, Eve can somehow obtain the key and cancel the effect of the
jamming signal. Hence, the eventual signal that Eve obtains is: Z = X + nE + nqE.
For simplicity of presentation, we define the random variable Z ′ as Z ′ = X + nE.
Since X ∼ N (0, P ) and ne ∼ N (0, σ2e), Z ′ follows a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance P + σ2E. Hence, the probability density function of Z is,
fZ(z) = fZ′(z) ∗ fnqE(z)
=
1
δ′E
∫ lσ
−lσ
fZ′(s)U[−δ′E/2,δ′E/2](z − s)ds
=
1
δ′E
∫ min(lσ,z+δ′E/2)
max(−lσ,z−δ′E/2)
fZ′(s)ds
=
1
δ′E
[
Q
(
max(−lσ, z − δ′E/2)√
P + σ2E
)
−Q
(
min(lσ, z + δ′E/2)√
P + σ2E
)]
, (4.3)
where U[a,b](.) is the rectangle function on [a, b], i.e. the value of the function is 1 on
the interval [a, b] and is zero elsewhere.
70
The random variable Z ′ given X = x has a Gaussian distribution with mean x
and variance σE. Thus, the probability density function of Z|X = x is,
fZ|X=x(z) = fZ′|X=x(z) ∗ fnqE(z)
=
1
δ′E
∫ min(lσ,z+δ′E/2)
max(−lσ,z−δ′E/2)
fZ′|X=x(s)ds
=
1
δ′E
[
Q
(
max(−lσ, z − δ′E
2
)− x
σE
)
−Q
(
min(lσ, z +
δ′E
2
)− x
σE
)]
(4.4)
Hence, I(X;Z) can be calculated by substituting (4.3) and (4.4) in (4.2). Similarly,
I(X;Y ) can be calculated by substituting Z with Y , σE with σB, and δ′E with δB
(where δB is the resolution of Bob’s A/D) in (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4). The achievable
secrecy rate can be found by substituting these expressions for the mutual information
into Rs = I(X;Y )− I(X;Z).
In the case that the channel between Alice and Eve is noiseless (e.g. Eve picks
up the transmitter), I(X;Z) can be obtained from (4.2) through the evaluation of
h(Z) and h(Z|X) given that the channel noise is zero. h(Z) can be found by setting
σ2E = 0 in (4.3), and h(Z|X) can be obtained as,
h(Z|X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
h(Z|X = x)fX(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(X + nqE|X = x)fX(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(nqE)fX(x)dx = log(δ
′
E) (4.5)
Numerical results are presented in the next section.
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Figure 4.4: I(X;Z) versus k (the number of key bits per jamming symbol) and m
(the span of Eve’s A/D) when Eve has a be = 20 bit A/D. Observe that the mutual
information is maximized when m = k (the red dashed line). Thus, Eve will set the
span of her A/D to 2k+1lσ.
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Figure 4.5: Achievable secrecy rates versus the number of key bits when Bob employs
a 10-bit A/D and Eve employs A/D’s of various quality. P = 1, l = 2.5, and the
signal-to-noise ratio of each of Eve’s channel and Bob’s channel is 30 dB.
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Figure 4.6: Achievable secrecy rates versus the signal-to-noise ratio of Eve’s channel
(SNRE) for various numbers of key bits per jamming symbol, when the SNR of Bob’s
channel is 60 dB. P = 1, l = 2.5, and both Bob and Eve use 10-bit A/Ds. Even
when the quality of Eve’s channel is much better than that of Bob’s channel, positive
secrecy rates can be achieved.
4.3.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we first show that I(X;Z) is maximized when Eve sets the span
of her A/D to avoid overflow, and then we study the achievable secrecy rates of the
proposed method for various scenarios. In order to maximize the mutual information
(I(X;Y ) or I(X;Z)), we set the quantization range by l = 2.5 [73]. Since I(X;Z)
is an intricate function of the span of Eve’s A/D (m) and the number of key bits
employed per jamming symbol (k), we find the maximum of this function numerically.
In Figure 4.4, I(X;Z) versus the span of Eve’s A/D m and the number of key bits
k when Eve employs a bE = 20 bit A/D is shown. It can be seen that the value
of I(X;Z) for various numbers of key bits per jamming symbol is maximized when
m = k. Thus, Eve will set the dynamic range of her A/D to 2k+1lσ to avoid overflow.
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In order to see how many cryptographic key bits per symbol are needed to achieve
secrecy, the curves of achievable secrecy rates versus the number of key bits per
jamming symbol, for various qualities of Eve’s A/D, are shown in Figure 4.5. In this
figure, the transmitter power P = E[X2] = 1, which does not include the jamming
power (Note that we will consider a total power constraint below in Figure 4.8).
Although the quality of each of Bob’s and Eve’s channel is the same with a signal-
to-noise ratio of 30 dB, and thus the secrecy capacity of the corresponding wiretap
channel is zero, positive secrecy rates are achieved through the proposed method.
Further, even in the case that Eve has an A/D of much better quality than Bob’s
A/D (or she has stacked multiple A/Ds of the same quality as Bob’s A/D until
limited by clock jitter), by utilizing more key bits per jamming symbol, which are
cheap cryptographic bits and can be obtained at little cost [73], positive secrecy rates
(i.e. expensive information-theoretically secure bits) can be obtained. The achievable
secrecy rates versus the signal-to-noise ratio of Eve’s channel (SNRE) for various
numbers of key bits per jamming symbol, when the SNR of Bob’s channel is 60 dB,
are depicted in Figure 4.6. It can be seen that, even in disadvantaged environments
where the quality of Eve’s channel is better than the quality of Bob’s channel, a
positive secrecy rate can be achieved. In Figure 4.7, we look at the extreme case
that Eve is able to receive exactly what Alice transmits (e.g. the adversary is able
to pick up the transmitter’s radio and hook directly to the antenna), but the channel
between Alice and Bob is noisy and hence no other classical technique3 is effective.
Finally, the secrecy rate versus the number of key bits per jamming symbol (k) for
a total power constraint is shown in Figure 4.8. The total power P + PJ = 1, Bob
and Eve each have a 10-bit A/D, and both channels have the same quality. When
k = 0, there is no jamming and all of the power is allocated to the signal; thus, the
3Quantum-cryptography techniques [4] are exempt from this.
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Figure 4.7: Achievable secrecy rates versus signal-to-noise ratio of Bob’s channel, for
various numbers of key bits per jamming symbol, when Eve’s channel is noiseless,
i.e. Eve has perfect access to what the transmitter sends and thus no other classical
technique is effective. P = 1, l = 2.5, and both Bob and Eve use 10-bit A/Ds.
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Figure 4.8: Secrecy rate versus the number of key bits per jamming symbol (k) for
various values of the total SNR, when P + PJ = 1, Bob and Eve each have a 10-bit
A/D, and the quality of both channels is the same.
secrecy rate is zero. As the number of key bits (and hence the power allocated to the
jamming signal) increases, the secrecy rate increases, until eventually, as the power
allocated to the portion of the signal containing the message becomes very small, it
tapers at high jamming powers.
4.4 Wideband Channels
Frequency hopping is a spread spectrum technique that divides the entire available
frequency band into sub-channels, such that at each time instance the signal is being
sent over one sub-channel according to an entry in a pre-specified hopping pattern.
When Alice and Bob have access to a wideband channel, they can utilize frequency
hopping using the cryptographic key described in Section 4.2.1 to obtain information-
theoretic secrecy. Alice sends a narrow-band signal with bandwidth W in a (large)
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frequency band of span F by employing a narrowband slot centered at a frequency
fc. The center frequency fc for each symbol is chosen based on the key from a
uniform ensemble of frequencies in the interval [−F/2 +W/2, F/2−W/2]. Since Bob
knows the key, he can tune his receiver to the correct frequency slot. Eve, since she
does not know the key during the time of transmission, does not know the correct
frequency slot and thus she is forced to either risk missing symbols that are out of her
bandwidth or expand the bandwidth of her receiver. As we will explain in Section
4.5, it is not feasible for a receiver to have a large bandwidth and a high resolution
A/D simultaneously. Hence, by using the random jamming scheme of Section 4.3 in
conjunction with frequency hopping, we can prevent an eavesdropper from obtaining
the message.
Let ZB be the total additive noise, including both channel and quantization noise,
at Bob’s receiver and ZE be the total additive noise at Eve’s receiver. In the case
of band-limited channels, since each of ZB and ZE is a superposition of a Gaussian
noise (channel) and a uniform noise (quantization), the capacity of Bob’s channel
and Eve’s channel cannot be found directly. Fortunately, upper and lower bounds on
the capacity of a band-limited channel with independent additive noise are available
[70, 35]. For a channel with bandwidth W , for a signal power of P and total additive
noise Z with power N , the capacity C lies between bounds,
W log
(
P +N
N
)
≤ C ≤ W log
(
P +N
EZ
)
, (4.6)
where EZ is the entropy power of Z. Suppose Z is a superposition of Gaussian noise
G and uniform noise U . Since G and U are zero-mean independent random variables,
N = E[Z2] = V ar(G) + V ar(U) = σ2 +
δ2
12
. (4.7)
The entropy power for a random variable Z is defined as,
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EZ = 1
2pie
22h(Z),
where h(Z) is the differential entropy of Z. Here, the entropy power of Z cannot be
easily calculated. Hence, we use the convolution inequality of entropy powers to find
an upper bound on EZ . The convolution inequality of entropy powers states that the
entropy power of the sum of two independent random variables is greater than or
equal to the sum of the entropy powers of the summands [70, 6]. Thus,
EZ ≥ EG + EU
= V ar(G) +
6
pie
V ar(U)
= σ2 +
δ2
2pie
. (4.8)
From (4.6) and (4.7), the capacity of Bob’s channel can be lower bounded as:
CB ≥ W log
(
P +NB
NB
)
= W log
(
P + σ2B +
δ2B
12
σ2B +
δ2B
12
)
. (4.9)
Now consider Eve’s receiver with bandwidthWE. IfWE < F , since Eve does not know
the hopping pattern, she will lose anything that is sent outside of the bandwidth that
she is currently monitoring, i.e. she can only obtain a fraction WE
F
of the message.
If in addition to frequency hopping, Alice adds a random jamming signal to the
transmitted signal, according to Section 4.3.1 Eve should increase the span of her
A/D to avoid A/D overflows. Suppose k bits per jamming symbol are employed by
Alice; hence, the new resolution of Eve’s A/D is
δ′E =
2lσ
2be−k
.
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Using this fact and from (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), an upper bound for the capacity of
Eve’s channel is:
CE ≤ WE
F
W log
(
P +NE
EZE
)
≤ WE
F
W log
P + σ2E + δ′2E12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2pie
 . (4.10)
Thus, from (4.9) and (4.10), a lower bound on the secrecy capacity is:
Cs = CB − CE
≥ W log
(
P + σ2B +
δ2B
12
σ2B +
δ2B
12
)
− WEW
F
log
P + σ2E + δ′2E12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2pie
 . (4.11)
Hence, any secrecy rate,
Rs =
[
W log
(
P + σ2B +
δ2B
12
σ2B +
δ2B
12
)
−WEW
F
log
P + σ2E + δ′2E12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2pie
+ , (4.12)
is achievable. The secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolution of Eve’s receiver is
shown in Figure 4.9. In this example, both Bob and Eve have channels with SNR
equal to 30 dB. Bob has a 20-bit A/D, W = 100 kHz, and transmitter span F = 100
MHz. In Figure 4.9(a) only frequency hopping is employed, and it can be seen that by
using a wideband receiver at Eve, the secrecy rate is zero. In Figure 4.9(b), in addition
to the frequency hopping, a random jamming signal with k = 20 bits per jamming
symbol is added to the signal, which helps the legitimate nodes to obtain a positive
secrecy rate (for this setting, the worst case rate of 2.736 bits/s/Hz is available),
even when Eve uses a wideband receiver and a high resolution A/D. However, in
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this case the number of jamming bits needed to gain a non-zero secrecy rate is large.
Furthermore, if Eve uses a wideband receiver with a very high resolution A/D, the
secrecy capacity with a 20-bit A/D at Bob will be zero. In the next section, we
will see that speed-resolution limitation of A/Ds helps us to obtain non-zero secrecy
rates with much fewer numbers of key bits per jamming symbol, and in all feasible
scenarios.
4.5 Discussion
A limiting factor in the performance of A/Ds is aperture jitter, which is the uncer-
tainty in the sampling time of the A/D. In order to better understand the relationship
between the aperture jitter of an A/D and its impact on an A/D’s performance, let
us consider the signal-to-noise-and-distortion ratio (SNDR) of an A/D. The SNDR of
an A/D is the ratio of the root mean square (rms) of the amplitude of the input signal
to the rms sum of all other spectral components. The signal-to-noise-and-distortion
ratio due to the aperture jitter tj when the input signal is sampled with frequency
fin is [39]:
SNDRj = 20 log10
(
1
2pifintj
)
. (4.13)
Hence, when other non-idealities (quantization noise, thermal noise, etc.) of the A/D
are not considered, (4.13) describes the performance limit of an A/D due to the
aperture jitter. The sampling rate versus SNDR for trends in the current state-of-
the-art of A/Ds is shown in Figure 4.10. In this figure, the performance envelope of
(4.13) is shown by a solid red line for tj = 1 ps, and a dashed red line for tj = 0.1 ps.
It can be seen that the best aperture jitter achieved by the current state-of-the art of
A/Ds is 0.1 ps.
The relationship between SNDR and effective number of bits (ENOB) can be
found by using the relationship between SNDR and number of bits for an ideal A/D,
80
10
4
10
6
10
8
10
10
10
12
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
2
4
6
8
10
W
E
 (Hz)Resolution of Eve’s A/D
R
s 
(b
it
s
/s
/H
z
)
(a) Frequency hopping
10
4
10
6
10
8
10
10
10
12
0
5
10
15
20
25
2
4
6
8
10
W
E
 (Hz)Resolution of Eve’s A/D
R
s 
(b
it
s
/s
/H
z
)
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Figure 4.9: Secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolution of Eve’s receiver: (a) fre-
quency hopping, (b) frequency hopping with a 20-bit random jamming signal. Both
Bob and Eve have channels of SNR equal to 30 dB. Bob has a 20-bit A/D, signal
bandwidth W = 100 kHz, and transmitter span F = 100 MHz. Without random
jamming, the worst case secrecy rate is zero, while with random jamming, a worst
case secrecy rate of 2.736 bits/s/Hz is achievable.
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Figure 4.10: Sampling frequency versus SNDR of published works from 1997 to 2014.
The red lines are jitter envelopes. The solid line corresponds to 1 ps aperture jitter
and the dashed line corresponds to 0.1 ps aperture jitter (courtesy of [56]).
SNDR = 6.02 ENOB + 1.76 dB (4.14)
Thus, in Figure 4.10, with a change in the scaling of the horizontal axis, SNDR is
equivalent to ENOB.
From the numerical results at the end of the previous section, it seems that it is al-
ways possible for Eve to use a wideband high-resolution A/D to compromise secrecy,
in the same way that a larger than envisioned memory at Eve would compromise
secrecy in the bounded memory model of [10, 11, 22, 23, 20]. However, from the dis-
cussion above, aperture jitter is a critical limitation in the performance of A/Ds that
prevents Eve from increasing the bandwidth and resolution of her A/D arbitrarily.
In fact, aperture jitter restricts the product of the sampling rate and the resolution
of an A/D.
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In Figure 4.11, the secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolution of Eve’s A/D,
when a 10-bit random jamming signal is added to the transmitted signal is shown. In
this figure, both Bob and Eve have channels with an SNR of 30 dB. Bob has a 20-bit
A/D, a signal bandwidth W = 100 kHz, and a transmitter span of F = 100 MHz.
The gray plane in this figure is the current technology jitter envelope. Assuming that
the eavesdropper has access to the best A/D with current technology, the bandwidth-
resolutions she can utilize are restricted to this jitter envelope, and anything beyond
this envelope is not feasible. Hence, the minimum secrecy rate in this case is 4.25
bit/s/Hz. This shows that, in practice, much fewer key bits per jamming symbol
are needed compared to Figure 4.9(b), and, for current technology (0.1 ps jitter),
the eavesdropper cannot compromise secrecy by employing a better A/D. Clearly, in
this case either the aperture jitter of the eavesdropper’s A/D should be known to
legitimate nodes, or they should assume that the eavesdropper has access to the best
current technology.
4.5.1 Aperture Jitter Evolution and Its Ultimate Limit
The best aperture jitter for A/Ds has changed from 100 ps in the 1980s to 0.1 ps in
the current state of the art. This improvement of the jitter might seem unfavorable to
our proposed method, as we rely on the non-ideality of the eavesdropper’s A/D. Thus,
if the jitter improves with the same slope, unbounded over time, it can destroy the
ability to transmit messages with the proposed method at some point in the future.
However, the trend of A/D jitter shows that the current state of the art was achieved
in 2005, and has not changed significantly since that time. This, along with the
fact that the technology scaling has changed dramatically since 2005, suggests that
the performance of A/D aperture jitter is already in a state of saturation [36, 56].
Nevertheless, it is possible that the aperture jitter improves over time. Fortunately,
83
Figure 4.11: Secrecy rate versus bandwidth and resolution of Eve’s receiver, when
a 10-bit random jamming signal is added to the transmitted signal. Both Bob and
Eve have channels with SNR of 30 dB. Bob has a 20-bit A/D, W = 100 kHz, and
transmitter bandwidth F = 100 MHz. The gray plane is the current technology jitter
envelope (0.1 ps). The bandwidth-resolutions on the right side of the gray plane are
not feasible by the current technology, and thus a worst case secrecy rate of 4.25
bits/s/Hz is available.
there exists an ultimate limit on the ability to store an accurate reconstruction of an
analog signal due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [83, 43, 44].
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a method to convert ephemeral “cheap” cryp-
tographic key bits to “expensive” information-theoretically secure bits to achieve ev-
erlasting security in wireless environments where the intended recipient Bob is at
a disadvantage relative to the eavesdropper Eve. A random jamming signal chosen
from a discrete uniform random ensemble based on a key pre-shared between the
transmitter Alice and Bob is added to each transmitted symbol. The intended re-
ceiver uses the key sequence to subtract the jamming signal, while the eavesdropper
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Eve, in order to prevent overflows of her analog-to-digital (A/D) converter, needs to
enlarge her A/D span and thus degrade the resolution of her A/D, thus resulting in
information loss even if Eve is handed the key at the conclusion of transmission and
is able to modify her recorded signal to attempt to remove the jamming effect. The
numerical results show that this method can provide secrecy even in the case that
the eavesdropper has perfect access to the output of the transmitter’s radio and an
A/D of much better quality than that of the intended receiver.
We have also considered the case when the legitimate nodes and the eavesdrop-
per have access to wideband channels. When the channel bandwidth is larger than
the signal bandwidth, the legitimate nodes can use their cryptographic key bits to
try to hide the location of the signal from Eve by employing a frequency hopping
technique. With this extra degree of freedom, since the product of the bandwidth
and the resolution of an A/D is limited by its aperture jitter, Eve will be forced to
make an additional tradeoff between A/D resolution and sampling frequency. Hence,
the strategy of system nodes is to use frequency hopping in conjunction with the
additive random jamming method. Eve must choose to either use a high resolution
A/D with small bandwidth and thus lose anything outside her bandwidth, or use a
wideband A/D with low resolution and thus be susceptible to the random jamming
signal. Technology trend lines and fundamental limits for A/Ds indicate this will pose
a significant challenge to Eve.
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CHAPTER 5
MINIMUM ENERGY ROUTING IN WIRELESS
NETWORKS IN THE PRESENCE OF JAMMING
The effectiveness and simple implementation of physical layer jammers make them
an essential threat to wireless networks. In a multihop wireless network, where jam-
mers can interfere with the transmission of user messages at intermediate nodes along
the path, one can employ jamming oblivious routing and then employ physical-layer
techniques (e.g. spread spectrum) to suppress jamming. However, whereas these ap-
proaches can provide significant gains, the residual jamming can still severely limit
system performance. This motivates the consideration of routing approaches that
account for the differences in the jamming environments of different paths. First,
we take a straightforward approach where an equal outage probability is allocated to
each link along a path and develop a minimum energy routing solution. Next, we
demonstrate the shortcomings of this approach and then consider the joint problem
of optimal outage allocation and routing by employing an approximation to the link
outage probability. This yields an efficient and effective routing algorithm that only
requires knowledge of the measured jamming at each node. Numerical results demon-
strate that the amount of energy saved by the proposed methods with respect to a
standard minimum energy routing algorithm, especially for parameters appropriate
for terrestrial wireless networks, is substantial.
5.1 Introduction
Due to their broadcast nature, wireless networks are susceptible to many security
attacks. Among them, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can severely disrupt network
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performance, and thus are of interest here. In particular, jamming the physical layer is
one of the simplest and most effective attacks, as any cheap radio device can broadcast
electromagnetic radiation to block the communication channel [60].
A straightforward approach to combat adversaries that jam transmissions in the
network, particularly in a system with transmitters and receivers capable of operating
over a large bandwidth, is to employ physical-layer mitigation techniques. Prominent
among these approaches are direct-sequence and frequency-hopped spread spectrum,
each of which employs a significantly larger bandwidth than that required for message
transmission in order to allow for interference suppression [63, 62]. These techniques
provide a significant reduction in the impact of the interference, often on the order
of the ratio of the system bandwidth to the data rate. However, interference can still
limit the performance of the system, or, stated differently, spread-spectrum might
simply increase the cost of the jamming for the adversary, whom may still be willing
to pay such a cost. In addition, the jammers may use alternate methods of jamming to
greatly impact receiver operation by compressing the dynamic range of the receiver’s
front-end [74].
This motivates the consideration of routing approaches to avoid adversarial jam-
mers if it can be justified from the perspective of minimizing total cost to the network.
In this work, we consider wireless communication between a source and a destination
in a multi-hop fashion in the presence of multiple physical layer jammers that are
spread over the network area at arbitrary locations by the adversary. We define that
cost to be the aggregate energy expended by the system nodes to reliably transmit a
message from the source to the destination, with reliability measured by an outage
constraint. The general routing problem has been studied extensively in the litera-
ture [9, 67, 21, 61]. Specifically, in [2] and [80], routing algorithms in the presence
of multiple jammers are investigated without considering the energy consumption of
the network nodes. Excessive energy consumption quickly depletes battery-powered
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nodes, and causes increased interference, resulting in lower network throughput; thus,
it is essential to seek methods to reduce energy consumption [25]. There has been
some study of energy-aware routing protocols in the literature [78, 66, 13, 46, 17], but
only a few works considered minimum energy routing with security considerations
[27, 28]. These works studied energy-aware routing in the presence of passive eaves-
droppers; however, minimum energy routing in the presence of active adversaries (i.e.
jammers) has not been considered.
In this chapter, we formulate the minimum energy routing problem with an end-
to-end outage probability constraint in a wireless multi-hop network with malicious
jammers. For exposition purposes and the simulation environment, the jammers
are assumed to be equipped with omni-directional antennas and able to propagate
radio signals over the entire frequency band utilized by the nodes in the network.
However, it will become apparent that the proposed algorithms apply to more general
environments, relying only on the measured jamming at each of the nodes in the
network and being agnostic of the manner in which that jamming was generated and
the geographical locations of the jammers (i.e. the solution easily addresses jammers
with directional antennas, etc.). We will consider both static jammers, which transmit
the jamming signal continuously, and simple dynamic jammers that switch randomly
between transmitting the jamming signal and sleeping mode.
A difficulty in solving this problem is deciding the local outage of the links that
form a path from source to destination so that the path satisfies an end-to-end out-
age requirement. We begin our exploration of the multi-hop minimum energy routing
problem in the presence of malicious jammers by considering a straightforward ap-
proach that allocates equal outage probability to each link along each potential path
from source to destination, in such a way that the resulting end-to-end outage prob-
ability satisfies a pre-specified threshold. In this scenario, the search for the optimal
path is complicated by a lack of knowledge of the number of hops in the optimal path
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a priori. After developing an algorithm to find the optimal path under this approach,
we then analyze the potential weaknesses of the solution. In particular, if certain
links along a path are subject to significant jamming relative to other links along
that path, it may be more energy efficient to allow larger outage probabilities on
those links subject to significant jamming. This motivates a more general approach
to the problem where the end-to-end outage constraint is allocated optimally to the
links along each path during the process of path selection. Unfortunately, the pres-
ence of jammers in combination with the end-to-end outage probability constraint
makes it difficult to find an optimal path with minimum energy cost. Hence, we use
a reasonable approximation to the outage probability on a given link, which allows
us to greatly simplify the optimization problem. In particular, we are able to readily
develop a fast and efficient algorithm that, importantly, does not rely on the detailed
jammer characteristics (locations, jamming powers) but rather only the observed (and
thus measurable) long-term average aggregate interference at each system node. Nu-
merical results are then presented to compare in detail the performance of the various
algorithms in terms of energy expended for a given network simulation scenario and
end-to-end outage constraint for both single-flow and multiple-flow scenarios. Finally,
we discuss how the proposed algorithm can be implemented in a distributed manner.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the system
model. The algorithm for minimum energy routing with equal outage per link is
considered in Section 5.3. The minimum energy routing with optimal outage per
link in the presence of static and dynamic jammers is presented in Section 5.4. In
Section 5.5, the results of numerical examples for various realizations of the system
are provided, and the comparison of the proposed methods to a benchmark shortest
path algorithm is presented. Conclusions and ideas for future work are discussed in
Section 5.7.
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5.2 System Model
5.2.1 System Model
We consider a wireless network where the system nodes are located arbitrarily.
Let G = (N ,L) denote the graph of the network where N denotes the set of net-
work nodes and L denotes the set of links between them (a link can be potentially
formed between any pair of nodes in the network). In addition, malicious jammers are
present in the network at arbitrary locations, and these jammers try to interfere with
the transmission of the system nodes by transmitting random signals. We assume
that each jammer utilizes an omni-directional antenna and can transmit over the en-
tire frequency band; thus, spread spectrum or frequency hopping strategies improve
performance via the processing gain, but are not completely effective in interference
suppression.
One of the system nodes (source) chooses relays, with which it conveys its message
to the destination in a (possibly) multi-hop fashion. Suppose the relays that the source
selects construct a K-hop route between the source and the destination. A K-hop
route Π is determined by a set of K links Π = 〈l1, . . . , lK〉 and K+1 nodes (including
source and destination) such that link lk connects the kth link transmitter Sk to the
kth link receiver Dk.
In this work we consider a delay-intolerant network, which is a common assump-
tion especially in military networks. If we enable retransmissions at relays, the local
retransmissions cause out of control returns of the message between relays, and thus
impose undesirable delay on the network. Hence, we do not consider local retrans-
missions in this work.
We denote the set of jammers by J and consider both static jammers and dynamic
jammers. In the case of static jammers, each jammer transmits white Gaussian
noise with a fixed power. Since the jammers are active, we assume initially that the
transmit power and the location of jammers are known to the system nodes; however,
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we will see that for our proposed method, knowledge of the transmit powers and
locations of jammers is not necessary ; in fact, the system nodes can measure the
average received jamming (averaged over the multipath fading) and use this estimate
of jamming interference for efficient routing. In the case of dynamic jammers, each
jammer switches between an “ON” state, when it transmits the jamming signal, and an
“OFF” state or sleeping mode randomly and independently from the other jammers.
These dynamic jammers are especially useful when the battery life of the jammers is
limited and the adversary tries to cover a larger area, as the jammers in sleep mode
can save significant energy.
5.2.2 Channel Model
We assume frequency non-selective Rayleigh fading between any pair of nodes. For
instance, for link k between nodes Sk and Dk, let hk denote the fading, and {hj,k}j∈J
denote the respective fading coefficients between jammers and Dk. It follows that
the channel fading power is exponentially distributed. Without loss of generality, we
assume E[|hk|2] = 1, ∀k, and E[|hj,k|2] = 1, ∀j, k, and then work path-loss explicitly
into (B.20) below. Also, each receiver experiences additive white Gaussian noise with
power N0. Hence, the signal received by node Dk from node Sk is
y(k) =
hk
√
Pk
d
α/2
k
x(k) +
∑
j∈J
hj,k
√
Pj
d
α/2
j,k
x(j) + n(k), (5.1)
where Pk is the transmit power of node Sk, Pj is the transmit power of the jth jammer,
dk is the distance between Sk and Dk, dj,k is the distance between j-th jammer and
Dk, and α is the path-loss exponent. Also, x(k) and x(j) are the unit power signals
transmitted by Sk and j-th jammer. If spread spectrum were employed, the model
would obviously change to include the processing gain and further averaging of the
fading, but the design process would be similar.
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Table 5.1: Table of notations
pi Desired end-to-end outage probability
pSDout The average source-destination (i.e.,
end-to-end) outage probability
pkout The average outage probability of kth
link
hk Fading coefficient of kth link
hj,k Fading coefficient between jth jammer
and the receiver node of link k
dk The distance between the transmitter
and receiver of link k
dj,k The distance between jth jammer and
kth receiver node
Pk Transmit power of the transmitter on kth
link
Pj Transmit power of jth jammer
Jk Expected value of the total received
power at the receiver of link k from jam-
mers
J Set of jammers in the network
N Set of network nodes
N Number of network nodes
L Set of links of the network
C(.) Cost of establishing the argument (link
or path)
α Path-loss exponent
γ The required signal-to-interference ratio
at each receiver
N0 Thermal noise power
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5.2.3 Path Outage Probability
Our goal is to find a minimum energy route between an arbitrary pair of nodes
in the network such that the desired average end-to-end probability of outage is
guaranteed. Hence, we need to find the set of relay nodes (links) with minimum
aggregate power such that the end-to-end probability of outage pSDout ≤ pi, where
pi is a predetermined threshold for the average outage probability. Let pkout denote
the average outage probability of link lk = 〈Sk, Dk〉; the source-destination outage
probability in terms of the outage probability of each link is,
pSDout = 1−
∏
1≤k≤K
(
1− pkout
)
. (5.2)
Implicit in our formulation is the end-to-end throughput of the path between the
source and destination. Let ρ denote the required end-to-end throughput. Since
the throughput of a path is determined by the throughput of its bottleneck link,
to minimize transmission energy of the path, it is necessary to achieve an equal
throughput over each link of the path. Thus, in our formulation of minimum energy
routing, the cost of each link is computed with respect to the required throughput ρ,
as described in the following subsection.
5.2.4 Analysis of Link Outage Probability
Consider the outage probability of a link in the presence of the set of jammers
J . The outage probability of link lk given its fading gain |hk|2 and the fading gains
between the jammers and the receiver of the link, i.e., {|hj,k|2}j∈J is,
pkout = P
{
Pk|hk|2/dαk
N0 +
∑
j∈J Pj|hj,k|2/dαj,k
< γ
}
, (5.3)
where γ is the required signal-to-interference ratio at the receiver. The value of
γ determines the link throughput. Specifically, for a desired throughput of ρ, by
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applying the Shannon capacity formula, the threshold γ is given by:
γ = 2ρ − 1.
Since the fading gain |hk|2 is distributed exponentially, conditioned on {|hj,k|2}j∈J ,
we obtain that,
pkout({|hj,k|2}j∈J ) = 1− exp
−γ
(
N0 +
∑
j∈J Pj |hj,k|2/dαj,k
)
Pk/d
α
k
 . (5.4)
Taking the expectation over the fading gains of the jammers yields:
pkout = E
1− exp
−γ
(
N0 +
∑
j∈J Pj |hj,k|2/dαj,k
)
Pk/d
α
k

= 1− e−
γN0d
α
k
Pk
∏
j∈J
E
[
exp
(
−γPj |hj,k|2/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
)]
= 1− e
− γN0d
α
k
Pk∏
j∈J
(
1 +
γPj/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
) , (5.5)
which is the expected outage probability for a link in the network. The last equality
follows from the fact that if the random variable X is exponentially distributed,
E[e−tX ] = 1
1+tλ−1 where λ = E[X] and t ∈ R.
5.2.5 Minimum Energy Routing: the Optimization Problem
Our goal is to find the optimum path that connects the source and destination
with minimum energy consumption for the communication subject to an end-to-end
outage probability constraint. The minimum energy routing problem is to find the
optimal path Π∗ so that:
Π∗ = argmin
Π∈set of all paths
C(Π) (5.6)
where C(Π) is the minimum cost to establish path Π, which is given by the following
optimization problem:
C(Π) = min
k=1, ...
Pk>0
,K,
∑
lk∈Π
Pk, s.t., pSDout(Π) ≤ pi. (5.7)
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By substituting (5.5) into (5.2), the constraint of this optimization problem is,
pSDout(Π) = 1−
∏
lk∈Π
e
− γN0d
α
k
Pk∏
j∈J
(
1 +
γPj/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
) ≤ pi. (5.8)
In order to find the minimum energy path, we need to find a closed-form for the cost
of establishing the k-th link, that is Pk, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K. However, because of the
presence of the jammers, (5.8) is an intricate function of Pk, making it difficult to find
a closed-form expression for the optimal path-cost. In this case, the naive way to find
the optimal source-destination path is to do a brute force search, which generally has
exponential complexity as it needs to check all paths in the network.
In order to find the minimum energy route described in this section, we take the
following approaches.
1. As a reasonable algorithm to help motivate our main approach, we first simplify
the problem and consider equal outage probabilities per-link such that the end-
to-end outage probability over the path is pi, which is described in the next
section. However, we show that this approach could lead to severe inefficiencies.
2. Thus, we use an approximation to tackle the complexity of the optimization
problem defined in (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8). Using the approximation, we develop
an algorithm to find the optimal route.
5.3 MER-EQ: Minimum Energy Routing with Equal Outage
per Link
As explained earlier, in this approach, we simplify the problem and consider equal
outage probabilities per links of the optimum path such that the desired end-to-end
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outage probability pi is guaranteed. If the optimum path has h hops, assuming equal
outage per link, the per-hop outage probability is,
ε(h) = 1− h√1− pi . (5.9)
Let C(u, v) denote the cost of the link between nodes u and v. The cost of es-
tablishing one link is a function of the outage probability of that link, which in turn
is dependent on the path length h. We use the notation Pu,v(ε(h)) to denote the
transmission power required for link `u,v when the link is part of a path of length h.
However, a difficulty of this approach is that the number of links of the optimum path
is not known a priori, and thus the per link outage probability ε(h) is not known.
This means that, in order to compute the cost of each link, we need to have the
optimal path, but in order to find the optimal path, we need to compute the cost of
each link. Because of the interdependency of link costs and optimal path, traditional
routing algorithms such as Dijkstra’s algorithm cannot be applied to this problem.
We need to design an algorithm where the cost of a link depends on the length of the
path.
To this end, we develop a two-step algorithm as follows. In the first step, we
assume the number of hops is h, and then we calculate the per-hop outage probability
by applying (5.9). Using this per-hop outage probability, we calculate the cost of
establishing each link assuming the link is on a path of length h from source to
destination. However, even with these link costs calculated, it is not trivial to perform
shortest path routing under the constraint that the route found must have h hops,
since standard shortest path algorithms (such as Dijkstra) do not enforce such a
constraint. Hence, we do the network expansion described in the next section before
running a standard shortest path algorithm to complete the first step of MER-EQ.
We repeat the first step for each possible number of hops h = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. The
second step produces the output of MER-EQ by selecting the route with minimum
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Algorithm 1 Network Expansion(G = (N ,L))
1: N ′ = {S}
2: L′ = {}
3: /* replicate every node of the original graph to N − 1 nodes (except source) */
4: for all u 6= s ∈ N do
5: N ′ = N ′ + {u(1), u(2), . . . , u(N − 1)}
6: end for
7: /* connect source node S to every u(1) node */
8: for all `S,u ∈ L do
9: L′ = L′ + `S,u(1)
10: end for
11: /* connect every u(h) to every v(h+ 1) node (u 6= v) */
12: for all `u,v
u6=s,u 6=d,v 6=s
∈ L do
13: for h = 1 to N − 2 do
14: L′ = L′ + `u(h),v(h+1)
15: end for
16: end for
17: return G′ = (N ′,L′)
energy among the N − 1 paths, one for each h = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, obtained in the first
step.
5.3.1 Selection of a Minimum Cost Path of Length h Hops
To enforce the selection of a route with h hops as required in the first step of
MER-EQ, we pre-process the network to create an expanded network as described in
Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, S and D denote the source and destination nodes.
The algorithm works by first adding S to the expanded network. Next, since the
longest path in a network of N nodes will have at most N − 1 hops, it adds N − 1
replicas for each node ui, i = 1, . . . , N − 1 to the expanded network. Let us denote
the hth replica of node ui by ui(h). Then links are added to the expanded network
such that a path from S to ui(h) will have exactly h hops (Figure 5.1). Similarly,
every path from source S to D(h) has h hops. Consequently, the shortest path from
S to D(h) in the expanded network has precisely h hops.
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Figure 5.1: Network expansion: add N−1 replicas for each node ui, i = 1, . . . , N−1 to
the expanded network. Then links (shown by dashed lines) are added to the expanded
network such that a path from S to ui(h) will have exactly h hops. Hence, every path
from S to D(h) has exactly h hops. A sample path from the source to uN−1(h) is
shown by bold solid lines.
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5.3.2 Routing Algorithm
The routing algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. To compute the minimum cost
path, first we find the shortest path for every number of hops, h = 1, . . . , N − 1 in
the expanded network by repeatedly employing Dijkstra’s algorithm (line 7). Then,
the algorithm chooses the path with minimum cost from source to destination and
returns the optimum path and its cost (lines 11 and 12). This path is computed by
finding the least cost path among the paths that have h = 1, 2, .., N − 1 hops. Let
Π(h) denote the minimum cost path of length h between the source and destination.
Then, the optimal path is computed as follows:
Π∗ = arg min
h
C(Π(h)).
5.3.3 Discussion
The algorithm described in this section is not optimal, since we force all links to
have the same outage probability. This limitation can increase the cost of communi-
cation unnecessarily. For example, consider a network in the presence of one jammer
in Fig. 5.2. Suppose that the end-to-end outage probability pSDout = 0.1, path-loss
exponent α = 2, jamming power Pj = 1, N0 = 1, and γ = 1. By using the MER-EQ
routing algorithm, the minimum-energy path from the source to the destination is a
two-hop path. In this case, in order to obtain pout = 0.1, the outage probability of
each link p1out = p2out = 0.051. Hence, from (5.5) the transmit power of the source
node is P1 = 34.5, and the transmit power of node 2 is P2 = 1868.2, and thus the
total power is P = 1902.7. The reason that P2 is so high is the interference from the
near jammer. However, if we change the outage probability allocation between the
two links, and allow the transmission between node 2 and the destination to have a
larger outage probability, we expect that the aggregate power consumption decreases.
For instance, suppose the outage probability of link l1 is p1out = 0.01 and the outage
probability of link l2 is p2out = 0.0909. In this case, from (5.5), the transmit power of
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Algorithm 2 MER-EQ(G′ = (N ′,L′))
1: for h = 1 to N − 1 do
2: /* for each link, set the link cost to the transmit power required to maintain
the outage probability ε(h) on the link */
3: for all `u,v ∈ L′ do
4: C(u, v) = Pu,v(ε(h))
5: end for
6: /* compute the shortest h-hop path */
7: [Π(h), C(h)] = Dijkstra(G′, s, d(h))
8: /* store the path and its cost in Π(h) and C(h) */
9: end for
10: /* choose the best path for reaching the destination */
11: h∗ = arg min
h
C(h)
12: return [Π(h∗), C(h∗)]
the source node is P1 = 181.5 and the transmit power of node 2 is P2 = 1011.1, and
thus the total power is P = 1192.6. We see that by relaxing the restriction on the
allocation of the outage probability between different links, the cost of communication
decreases significantly.
Moreover, in order to find the optimal path we basically need to apply the shortest
path algorithm N −1 times, which makes this approach inefficient in term of running
time in large networks. Each application of the Dijkstra’s algorithm in the expanded
network requires a running time of O(N2 logN), and thus the algorithm MER-EQ
takes O(N3 logN) time to run.
In the remainder of this chapter, we present a minimum energy routing algorithm
with optimal outage per link and demonstrate how using an estimate of the end-to-
end outage probability leads to a fast and efficient algorithm that improves the energy
efficiency of the network significantly.
100
d=1 
d=1 
d=0.1 
Source 
Destination 
Jammer 
1
l
2
l
1 
2 
3 
Figure 5.2: A wireless network in the presence of one jammer is shown here. In
this network, by allocating unequal outage probability to different links, the cost of
communication decreases significantly.
5.4 MER-OP: Minimum Energy Routing with Optimal Out-
age per Link
In this section, we present our minimum energy routing algorithm with optimal
outage per link by considering the end-to-end outage constraint. From (5.5), the
per-hop outage probability pkout is,
pkout = 1−
e
− γN0d
α
k
Pk∏
j∈J
(
1 +
γPj/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
)
≤ 1− e
− γN0d
α
k
Pk∏
j∈J e
γPj/d
α
j,k
Pk/d
α
k
= 1− e
− γN0d
α
k
Pk
e
∑
j∈J
γPj/d
α
j,k
Pk/d
α
k
, (5.10)
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where the inequality comes from the fact that ex ≥ 1 + x for x ≥ 0. While this is
a conservative estimate of the end-to-end outage probability, our simulation results
show that it results in an effective solution that results in significant energy savings.
From (5.10) we have,
pkout ≤ 1− e−
γdαk
Pk
(N0+Jk), (5.11)
where Jk is the expected value of the total received power at node Dk from all jam-
mers, i.e. Jk =
∑
j∈J Pj/d
α
j,k. Importantly, this approximation not only enables the
development of an efficient routing algorithm, but also simplifies the implementation
of the algorithm in real networks. While the exact outage probability as given in (5.5)
requires the knowledge of jammer powers and their locations, the approximation in
(5.11) requires only the knowledge of the “average” jamming power received at a node,
which can be readily measured.
5.4.1 Optimal Cost of a Given Path
Our objective is to find the optimum path and the minimum transmission power
required to establish the path to satisfy the outage probability pi, First, we find the
optimal power allocation for a given path Π, and then use this result to design a
routing algorithm to find the optimal path. To this end, the optimal power allocation
problem for a given path Π = 〈l1, ..., lK〉 is described by the following optimization
problem:
min
k=1, ...
Pk>0
,K
∑
lk∈Π
Pk,
subject to:
pSDout = 1−
∏
lk∈Π
(1− pkout) ≤ pi.
From (5.11) the equivalent constraint is,
∑
lk∈Π
dαk
(
N0 + Jk
Pk
)
≤  = − ln(1− pi)
γ
. (5.12)
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Since the left side of (5.12) is a decreasing function of Pk and our goal is to find
the route with minimum cost, the inequality constraint can be substituted by the
following equality constraint,
∑
lk∈Π
dαk
(
N0 + Jk
Pk
)
= . (5.13)
To find the optimal link costs, we use the Lagrange multipliers technique. Thus, we
need to solve (5.13) and the following K equations simultaneously,
∂
∂Pi
{∑
lk∈Π
Pk + λ
(∑
lk∈Π
dαk
(
N0 + Jk
Pk
)
− 
)}
= 0,
i = 1, . . . , K.
Taking the derivative, we obtain that,
1− λdαi
(N0 + Ji)
P 2i
= 0, i = 1, . . . , K, (5.14)
and thus,
Pi =
√
λdαi (N0 + Ji). (5.15)
On substituting Pi from (5.15) into (5.13), we have,
λ =
1
2
(∑
lk∈Π
√
dαk (N0 + Jk)
)2
. (5.16)
Hence, by substituting λ from (5.16) into (5.15), the optimal cost of each link is given
by,
Pi =
1

√
dαi (N0 + Ji)
∑
lk∈Π
√
dαk (N0 + Jk), (5.17)
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and the optimal cost of path Π is given by,
C(Π) = 1

(∑
lk∈Π
√
dαk (N0 + Jk)
)2
. (5.18)
Note that the cost of establishing each link depends on the summation of noise power
and the expected received jamming signal No+Jk, and thus in order to calculate cost
of each link we do not even need to separate the jamming signal from the noise.
5.4.2 Routing Algorithm
The optimal path cost structure in (5.18) allows us to find the minimum energy
route from source to destination as follows. First assign the link weight C(lk) =√
dαk (N0 + Jk) to each potential link lk in the network. Now apply any classic shortest-
path algorithm such as Dijkstra’s algorithm. This path minimizes the end-to-end
weight
∑
lk∈Π
√
dαk (N0 + Jk) and thus it will also minimize the source-destination
path cost C(Π) in (5.18). We note that the running time of this algorithm, referred to
as MER-OP, is in O(N logN) as it essentially invokes the Dijkstra’s algorithm once.
Now, each node in route Π transmits the message to the next node until it reaches
the destination. The transmit power of each node is determined by (5.17) and the
actual outage probability of each link can be obtained from (5.11).
5.4.3 Heuristic Adjustment of Transmit Powers
Consider the optimum route Π that is found by applying the MER-OP algorithm.
Suppose that route Π consists of H hops, and its achieved end-to-end outage proba-
bility is pSDout . Since we consider an upper bound for the end-to-end outage probability
in developing MER-OP, the achieved end-to-end outage probability pSDout might be less
than the allowed outage probability pi,
pSDout ≤ pi, (5.19)
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Consequently, MER-OP with the Pi’s set as in (5.17) can be too conservative in some
instances. In order to address this, we apply the following heuristic. Let δ be the ratio
of the actual end-to-end success probability 1−pSDout to the desired success probability
1− pi. From (5.19),
δ =
1− pi
1− pSDout
≤ 1.
Now suppose that we set a new success probability for each link in the optimal route
by multiplying the success probability of each link by a factor H
√
δ. Hence, the new
success probability of each link in the optimal route is H
√
δ(1 − pkout), which is less
than the old success probability of that link since H
√
δ ≤ 1. By using this approach,
we reduce the required success probability of each link, and thus from (5.5), the
cost of establishing each link decreases, which results in less energy consumption of
the algorithm MER-OP. In this case, the new end-to-end success probability can be
calculated as,
∏
k=1,...,H
H
√
δ(1− pkout)
= δ
∏
k=1,...,H
(1− pkout)
= δ(1− pSDout) = 1− pi,
which is equal to the desired source-destination success probability. Hence, by ap-
plying this heuristic, the resultant end-to-end outage probability will be equal to the
allowed outage probability while the aggregate cost of communication on the path
selected by MER-OP will be less than when we do not apply this heuristic.
5.4.4 Routing in the Presence of Dynamic Jammers
In this section, we consider the case of dynamic jammers, where each jammer
alternates between a jamming mode and a sleeping mode. We model the probabilistic
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behavior of jammers by i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables βj, j ∈ J , such that,
p(βj = 1) = 1− p(βj = 0) = q
Using (5.3), the average outage probability of link lk is:
pkout = E
1− exp
−γ
(
N0 +
∑
j∈J Pjβj |hj,k|2/dαj,k
)
Pk/d
α
k

= 1− e−
γN0d
α
k
Pk
∏
j∈J
E
[
exp
(
−γPjβj |hj,k|2/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
)]
= 1− e−
γN0d
α
k
Pk
∏
j∈J
{
qE
[
exp
(
−γPj |hj,k|2/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
)]
+ (1− q)
}
= 1− e−
γN0d
α
k
Pk
∏
j∈J
 q(1 + γPj/dαj,kPk/dαk ) + 1− q

≤ 1− e−
γN0d
α
k
Pk
∏
j∈J
e
− γqPj/d
α
j,k
Pk/d
α
k , (5.20)
where the expectations are computed over {βj}j∈J and {|hj,k|2}j∈J , respectively.
The inequality is from the fact that for q ≤ 1 and x ≥ 0, e−qx ≤ q
1+x
+ 1 − q, which
is tight for x 1.
Thus, the average probability of outage for each link is given by,
pkout ≤ 1− e−
γdαk
Pk
(N0+Jk), (5.21)
where Jk = q
∑
j∈J Pj/d
α
j,k. The cost of an optimum path Π in this case can be found
by a similar derivation as in Section 5.4.1,
C(Π) = 1

(∑
lk∈Π
√
dαk (N0 + Jk)
)2
, (5.22)
where  = − ln(1−pi)
γ
. Hence, by employing an estimate of the average jamming
power obtained from recent channel measurements, assigning the link cost C(lk) =
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√
dαk (N0 + Jk) to each potential link lk in the network, and applying the routing
algorithm discussed in the previous section, the optimal route can be found.
5.5 Simulation Results
We consider a wireless network in which n system nodes and nj jammers are
placed uniformly at random on a d × d square. We assume that the closest system
node to point (0, 0) is the source and the closest system node to the point (d, d) is
the destination.
Our goal is to find a minimum energy route between the source and the destination.
We assume that the threshold γ = 1 (corresponding to throughput ρ = 1), and the
noise power N0 = 1. To analyze the effect of propagation attenuation on the proposed
algorithms, we consider α = 2 for free space, and α = 3 and α = 4 for terrestrial
wireless environments.
Please note that because of using the approximation, the optimal route obtained
by MER-OP is not the absolute minimum energy route. However, we show in this
section that MER-OP finds a route that takes detours to effectively bypass the jam-
mers and also allocates suitable amounts of power to the transmitters in such a way
that it results in significant energy savings compared to MER-EQ.
For the benchmark routing algorithm, we consider a minimum energy routing
(MER) algorithm from the source to the destination with end-to-end target outage
probability pi. The MER algorithm is described in the following subsection.
5.5.1 MER: Minimum Energy Routing
Consider a wireless network with a source, a destination, and some other nodes
that can be used as relays (without jammers). The goal is to convey the message with
minimum aggregate power such that an end-to-end outage probability is guaranteed.
The outage probability of link lk is given by,
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pkout = 1− exp
(−γN0dαk
Pk
)
. (5.23)
Using the technique presented in Section 5.4, the optimal cost of path Π is given by:
C(Π) = 1

(∑
lk∈Π
√
dαk
)2
.
Hence, we assign the link cost C(lk) =
√
dαk to each potential link lk in the network
and apply Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the optimum route.
By using the MER algorithm, the minimum energy route, the outage probability
of each link, and the transmit power of the source and each intermediate relay on
this route can be found. Now suppose an adversary spreads a number of jammers
in the network. In this case, we do not change the source-destination route and the
outage probabilities that are allocated to the links that belong to this route. However,
because of the interference due to the jammers at each receiver, the transmitters need
to increase their transmit power to have the same per link outage probability as when
the jammers were not present. Since the channel gains between jammers and system
nodes are exponentially distributed, the average outage probability at each receiver
of route Π is given by (see the derivation presented in Section 5.2 for the link outage
probability):
pkout = 1−
e
− γN0d
α
k
Pk∏
j∈J
(
1 +
γPj/dαj,k
Pk/d
α
k
) . (5.24)
This equation can be solved numerically to find the required power of each link
{Pk}lk∈Π in the presence of jammers. As in the other approaches described earlier,
the aggregate transmit power of the MER algorithm in the presence of jammers is
considered as the cost of the scheme.
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5.5.2 Performance Metric
Our performance metric is the energy saved due to the use of each algorithm. The
energy saved is defined as the reduction in the energy consumption of the system
nodes when each algorithm is applied with respect to the energy consumption when
system nodes use the benchmark algorithm (i.e. MER).
A snapshot of the network when n = 30, nj = 50, Pj = 1, pi = 0.1, and α = 2 is
shown in Fig. 5.3. The MER-OP path, MER-EQ path, and MER path are plotted in
this figure. The percentage of energy saved in this example for MER-OP is 63.57%
and for MER-EQ is 54.47%. As can be seen, using the MER-OP algorithm is more
energy efficient than MER-EQ.
The MER-EQ, MER-OP, and MER paths for the same placement of the system
nodes and jammers as in the networks of Fig. 5.3 for a higher path-loss exponent
(α = 4) are shown in Fig. 5.4. In this case, the energy saved for MER-OP is 93.54%
and for MER-EQ is 88.21% . Note that although in this case the MER-OP algorithm
and the MER-EQ algorithm both choose the same route, the percentage of energy
saved using the latter approach is smaller, because we force all links in the path to
have the same outage probability. This shows the superiority of MER-OP algorithm
over MER-EQ algorithm, as is also discussed in Section 5.3.3.
In the sequel, we average our results over randomly generated networks. The
performance metric is the average energy saved, where the averaging is over 100
random realizations of the network. We consider the effect of various parameters
of the network on the average energy saved by using the MER-OP and MER-EQ
algorithms.
5.5.3 Number of Jammers
The effect of the number of jammers on the average energy saved for different
values of the path-loss exponent is shown in Fig. 5.5. It can be seen that the
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performance of MER-OP algorithm is always superior to the performance of MER-
EQ algorithm, which is because of the constraint on the outage probability of each
hop of MER-EQ. For both algorithms the average energy saved is not sensitive to the
number of jammers. The fluctuations in this figure are due to the random generation
of the network. On the other hand, the effect of the path-loss exponent on the average
energy saved is dramatic. For terrestrial wireless environments (α = 3 and α = 4),
the average energy saved by both algorithms is substantially higher than for free space
wireless environments (α = 2). The reason is that in the environment with a higher
path-loss exponent, the effect of the jamming signal is local and thus the jamming
aware routes can take detours to avoid the jammers and obtain much higher energy
efficiency.
5.5.4 Jamming Power
The effect of jamming power on the average energy saved is shown in Fig. 5.6.
Again the energy efficiency of MER-OP algorithm is higher than that of MER-EQ
algorithm due to optimal allocation of the per-link outage probabilities. As the jam-
ming power increases, the percentage of the energy saved by using both algorithms
increases. Clearly, when the jamming power is higher, the impact of jamming on
communication is greater, and thus bypassing the jammers can lead to more energy
efficiency of the routing algorithm.
5.5.5 Size of Network
The average energy saved versus the size of the network is shown in Fig. 5.7, where
the area of the network changes from a 1× 1 square to a 10× 10 square. The average
energy saved for terrestrial wireless environments for both algorithms is nearly 100%.
When free space parameters are used (α = 2), MER-OP algorithm always has a better
performance than MER-EQ algorithm. Also, it can be seen that the percentage of
the energy saved of using both algorithms is higher for smaller network areas. The
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reason is that in a smaller network, the effect of jamming on the communication is
higher and thus taking a route that bypasses the jammers helps more to improve the
energy efficiency.
5.5.6 Outage Probability
In Fig. 5.8, the percentage of average energy saved versus the outage probability is
shown. For α = 3, and α = 4, the average energy saved is always very close to 100%.
For α = 2, as the outage probability increases, more outages in the communication
are acceptable, and thus lower power is needed to mitigate the effect of a jammer
close to the communication link. Hence, when the outage probability is greater,
the percentage of energy saved by using a better path is less than when the outage
probability is smaller.
5.5.7 Power Histogram
To further investigate the enormous gains in average energy for higher values
of α, the histograms of the number of network realizations versus the total cost of
transmission (aggregate power) for (a) MER algorithm, (b) MER-OP algorithm, and
(c) MER-EQ algorithm for 103 realizations of the network are shown in Fig. 5.9.
In this figure α = 4, pi = 0.1, n = 20, and nj = 30. For the MER, it can be seen
that the values of the total cost are scattered, and the average energy is dominated
by a few bad realizations. On the other hand, when MER-OP and MER-EQ are
used, the values of the total cost are concentrated around a central value (here 104).
This explains the large gains in average energy shown in previous sections, and also
indicates that the MER-OP and MER-EQ are robust against changes in the system
node and jammer placements.
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5.5.8 Network Throughput
When MER-OP is used, we expect the network can achieve a higher throughput,
since the transmit powers of the nodes in the optimal path are smaller, and thus more
nodes can transmit their messages simultaneously. To study network throughput, in
this section, we simulate multiple concurrent flows in the network and implement
scheduling in addition to routing. The maximum throughput for a given number of
concurrent flows can be obtained as follows.
Scheduling problem. Consider a subset S ⊆ L of the links. We call S a “transmis-
sion set” if all links in S can be scheduled concurrently. Moreover, S is a “maximal”
transmission set if it cannot be grown further. Let S = {S1, . . . , SM} denote the
set of all maximal transmission sets of the network. A schedule is specified by a
set of weights α = {α1, . . . , αM}, where each weight 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 specifies the frac-
tion of time for which the maximal transmission set Si is scheduled1. It follows that∑M
i=1 αi = 1 for a feasible schedule. In general, there is an exponential number of
maximal transmission sets in a network and finding them is an NP-hard problem [48].
Maximal transmission sets. To obtain a practical approximation, we can use only
a subset of all maximal transmission sets. As we increase the number of maximal
transmission sets, the accuracy of the approximation increases. Algorithm 3 is used
repeatedly to obtain a subset of all maximal transmission sets.
Throughput. Suppose there are L flows in the network denoted by F = {f1, . . . , fL}.
Let xi denote the rate of flow fi and X = {x1, . . . , xL}. The optimal path computed
for flow fi is denoted by Πi. Our goal is to compute the maximum flow rate in the
network. Let λ denote the capacity of link `k, which is a constant for every link in
the network (this is ensured by our power allocation algorithm).
• The total flow rate that passes through link `k is given by,
1We assume a time slotted system where each time slot is of unit length. The weights αi specify
the fraction of time each set Si is scheduled in a time slot using a TDMA scheduler.
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Algorithm 3 Maximal Transmission Sets
1: S ← {}
2: while L 6= {} do
3: Choose `i ∈ L at random
4: L ← L\{`i}
5: if `i is schedulable with S then
6: S ← S ∪ {`i}
7: end if
8: end while
9: return S
∑
∀fi∈F : `k∈Πi
xi
• The total capacity of link `k adjusted for scheduling is given by,
λ ·
∑
∀Si∈S: `k∈Si
αi
To compute the maximum throughput, one has to solve the following optimization
problem:
max
∑
fi∈F
xi (5.25)
subject to:∑
∀fi∈F : `k∈Πi
xi ≤ λ ·
∑
∀Si∈S: `k∈Si
αi (5.26)
∑
αi∈α
αi = 1 (5.27)
αi ≥ 0 (5.28)
Since the constraints as well as the objective function are linear, the above problem is
a convex optimization problem if the routes Πi and maximal transmission sets Si are
known. We used Matlab to solve this optimization problem and compute the total
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throughput. The throughputs versus the number of concurrent flows for MER-OP
and for MER are shown in Fig. 5.10. The end-to-end outage probability is pi = 0.2,
where n = 10 system nodes and nj = 20 jammers are present. As expected, the
MER-OP can achieve higher throughput than the MER algorithm.
Energy per bit. In order to compare the amount of energy each algorithm needs
to obtain the throughput shown in Fig. 5.10, the energies per bit versus the outage
probability for MER-OP and MER are shown in Fig. 5.11. Energy per bit is obtained
by dividing the total power consumed by the system nodes divided by the maximum
throughput of the network for a given number of flows. In this figure, the maximum
throughput when five concurrent flows exists in the network, where n = 10 system
nodes and nj = 20 jammers are present, is plotted. As expected, in both algorithms
for higher outage probabilities less energy per bit is required. Also, the amount of
energy per bit MER-OP uses is about two orders of magnitude less than the amount
of energy per bit MER consumes.
5.5.9 Dynamic Jammers
In this section, we investigate the effect of the number of dynamic jammers on
the average energy saved when employing MER-OP. The average energy saved versus
number of jammers for probability of a jammer being “ON”, q = 0.3 and q = 0.7,
and for various values of the path-loss exponent, α = 2, 3, 4, are considered in Fig.
5.12. The simulations are done over 100 random realizations of the network. As can
be seen, the average energy saved is again insensitive to the number of jammers (the
fluctuations in this figure are due to the randomness of the network realizations).
For α = 2, the percentage of energy saved is higher when q is greater, since the
effect of jammers on the network is greater and thus, by using MER-OP algorithm
and bypassing the jammers, a higher energy efficiency can be gained. For terrestrial
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wireless environments, i.e. for α = 3 and α = 4, the average energy saved by using
MER-OP is always substantial and close to 100%.
5.5.10 Distributed Implementation
It is useful to mention that distributed implementation of the algorithms presented
in this chapter is straightforward. The link costs introduced in previous sections can
be calculated locally by using the average of the total jamming signal at each node,
and this information can be passed to neighboring nodes. Then, any distributed
distance vector routing technique such as the Bellman-Ford algorithm can be used to
find the minimum energy path.
5.6 Related Work
Spread Spectrum and Beamforming. Traditional methods to combat jam-
ming attacks include spread spectrum and beamforming [63, 62, 68, 51, 89]; however,
these approaches are only a partial solution in the case of broadband jammers, jam-
mers with directional antennas, or multiple jammers, and, as discussed in the Intro-
duction, these methods often simply increase the cost of jamming. Nevertheless, our
routing algorithms can be used in conjunction with these techniques to increase the
robustness of the system against jamming attacks.
Other Jamming Evasion Techniques. When the system nodes are able to
move, they can simply leave the jammed area to a safe place. This is the basis of the
spatial retreat technique, in which the system nodes move away from a stationary
jammer [88, 86]. Another jamming evasion technique is channel surfing, where the
system nodes basically change their communication frequency to an interference-free
frequency band when necessary [87]. These approaches, however, are orthogonal to
the problem considered here which deals with static nodes.
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One-Hop Communication in the Presence of Jamming. Several works
consider one-hop energy aware communication in the presence of one jammer [52, 50,
90, 40]. It is usually treated as a game between a jammer and two system nodes.
The objective of the jammer is to increase the cost (energy) of communication for
the system nodes, whereas the objective of the system nodes is increasing the cost of
jamming for the jammer and conveying their message with a minimum use of energy.
Unlike these approaches, in this work we consider multi-hop communication in the
presence of many jammers.
Energy Aware Routing. In order to minimize energy consumption in wireless
networks, numerous energy–efficient routing algorithms have been studied [78, 66, 13,
46, 17, 53]. For instance, in [53] minimum energy routing with a minimum end-to-end
probability of error is considered; however, their physical layer model is significantly
different than that considered here, and they also did not consider jammers. Instead
of the total energy usage of the network nodes, some works consider the battery
usage of each node, or balanced energy dissipation in the network as their criteria
[69, 26, 14]. For example, in [69], instead of choosing one source-destination path,
the algorithm chooses several paths and uses them alternatively to avoid quick energy
depletion of each path. While minimum energy routing has been studied extensively,
a few works (e.g. see [27, 28]) considered security-aware routing. However, unlike
our work, they considered routing in the presence of passive eavesdroppers, which is
different from the problem considered in this work with active jammers.
5.7 Conclusions
In this work we considered the minimum energy routing problem in the presence
of static and simple dynamic jammers. A difficulty in solving this problem was decid-
ing the local outage of the links that form a path from source to destination so that
the path satisfies an end-to-end outage requirement. First, we took a straightforward
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approach where an equal outage probability is allocated to each of the links along the
path and developed a minimum energy routing solution under such an assumption.
Next, we demonstrated the shortcomings of such an approach by illustrating situa-
tions where it is advantageous to allocate different outage probabilities to different
links along the path. Motivated by this observation, we considered the general prob-
lem of minimum energy routing with optimal outage allocation along paths. Faced
by an intractable optimization problem, we employed an approximation to the link
outage probability that yielded an efficient and effective algorithm that only requires
knowledge of parameters of the jammers that are easily obtained by the system nodes.
Numerical results are provided to compare and contrast these various approaches, and
it is shown that the amount of energy saved by the proposed method with respect to
the benchmark shortest path routing and the straightforward equal outage allocation
approach, especially in terrestrial wireless networks with path-loss exponents greater
than two, is substantial.
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Figure 5.3: A snapshot of the network when n = 30 system nodes (shown by circles)
and nj = 50 jammers (shown by *) are placed uniformly at random. The transmit
power of each jammer Pj = 1, the target end-to-end outage probability pi = 0.1, and
the path-loss exponent α = 2. The optimum route for MER-OP is shown by the
dashed line (green), the optimum route for MER-EQ is shown by solid line (blue),
and the MER route is shown by the dash-dotted line (red). The energy saved in this
network for MER-OP is 63.57% and for MER-EQ is 54.47% .
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Figure 5.4: A snapshot of the network with the same system node and jammer place-
ment as in Fig. 5.3. Transmit power of each jammer Pj = 1, target outage probability
pi = 0.1, and transmission in a lossy environment is considered (α = 4). The MER-
OP path is shown by the dashed line (green), the MER-EQ path is shown by the solid
line (blue), and the MER path is shown by the dash-dotted line (red). The energy
saved in this network for MER-OP is 93.54% and for MER-EQ is 88.21%.
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Figure 5.5: Average energy saved vs. number of static jammers for different values of
the path-loss exponent. The transmit power of each jammer Pj = 1, the end-to-end
target probability of outage pi = 0.1, and n = 20 system nodes are considered. The
system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a 10×10 square.
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Figure 5.6: Average energy saved vs. jamming power of each malicious jammer for
different values of the path-loss exponent. nj = 20 number of jammers, n = 20
system nodes, and end-to-end target probability of outage pi = 0.1 are considered.
The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a 10 × 10
square.
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Figure 5.7: Average energy saved vs. area of the network for different values of the
path-loss exponent. The transmit power of each jammer Pj = 1, nj = 20 number of
jammers, n = 20 system nodes, and end-to-end target probability of outage pi = 0.1
are considered.
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Figure 5.8: Average energy saved vs. end-to-end outage probability (pi) for different
values of the path-loss exponent. The transmit power of each jammer Pj = 1, and
nj = 20 jammers and n = 20 system nodes are considered. The system nodes and
the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a 10× 10 square.
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Figure 5.9: The histograms of the number of network realizations versus cost of
transmission (aggregate power) for (a) MER, (b) MER-OP, and (c) MER-EQ are
shown. The system nodes and the jammers are placed uniformly at random over a
10× 10 square, where α = 3, pi = 0.1, n = 20, and nj = 50. For the benchmark, the
values of the total cost are scattered, and the average energy is dominated by a few
bad realizations, while for (b) and (c), the values of the total cost are concentrated
around a central value (here 104).
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Figure 5.10: Throughput versus the number of concurrent flows for the MER-OP
algorithm and for MER, when the end-to-end outage probability is pi = 0.2, and
n = 10 system nodes and nj = 20 jammers are present.
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Figure 5.11: Energy per bit versus the end-to-end outage probability for MER-OP
and MER. The throughput is measured for five concurrent flows, where n = 10 system
nodes and nj = 20 jammers are present in the system. The amount of energy per bit
MER-OP uses is about two orders of magnitude less than MER.
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Figure 5.12: Average energy saved vs. number of dynamic jammers for different
values of the path-loss exponent and probability q of a jammer being in “ON” state.
The transmit power of each jammer Pj = 1, the target end-to-end outage probability
pi = 0.1, and n = 20 system nodes are considered. The system nodes and the jammers
are placed uniformly at random over a 10× 10 square.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation we have considered secrecy, which is an important area of
concern in contemporary wireless communication. The primary approach to obtain
secrecy in most modern wireless systems is cryptography, which typically relies on
a secret key shared by trusted parities, the current and future limited computa-
tional ability of the eavesdropper, and debatable assumptions about the complexity
of certain algorithms. These limitations of cryptographic secrecy have motivated
progress on information-theoretic secrecy, which is provably everlasting and uncondi-
tional with respect to the eavesdropper’s computational abilities. However, in order
to attain information-theoretic secrecy, an advantage for the channel to the main re-
cipient over the channel to the eavesdropper is necessary. Unfortunately in wireless
communication the channels are out of control of system nodes, and even with the
methods that try to degrade the channel to the eavesdropper, the resultant scenario
might not be as expected, and thus the eavesdropper might be able to decode the
message immediately. So many would argue that we have traded a long-term com-
putational risk (cryptography) for a short-term scenario risk (information-theoretic
secrecy).
In this dissertation we considered attacking aspects of the hardware of Eve to
obtain an information-theoretic advantage. First we introduced the idea that the sys-
tem nodes employ general memoryless nonlinearities based on a key. Then we studied
the practical instances of this approach. As a first step, a rapid power modulation
instance of this approach was considered in Chapter 3, where the signal is modulated
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by two vastly different power levels at the transmitter. Since Bob knows the key, he
can undo the effect of the power modulation before his A/D, putting his signal in
the appropriate range for analog-to-digital conversion, while Eve must compromise
between larger quantization noise and more A/D overflows. Consequently, she will
lose the information she needs to recover the message, and information-theoretic se-
crecy is obtained. We have shown that using this approach, even when Eve’s channel
condition is significantly better than that of Bob, reasonable secrecy rates can be
achieved. And, importantly, in the case that the adversary is able to pick up the
transmitter’s radio (i.e. Eve has perfect access to the output of the transmitter), a
reasonable secrecy rate is achievable at high SNRs which can apply to a short-range
wireless system. For example, one might use the transmission power of typical cellu-
lar systems with the corresponding excess power at short ranges to establish a secure
radio system in a limited area.
Although we have considered in Chapter 3 the case of Eve with a better A/D
than Bob, the clear risk to the approach is still that of asymmetric capabilities at the
receivers. For example, if we employ the simple power modulation approach studied
extensively in Chapter 3, Eve may employ multiple A/D’s with different gain settings
in front of each. Hence, Eve would be able to record two signals independently and
decode them later when she gets the key or extracts the key based on the pattern of
erasures and overflows at each A/D. In order to combat such a sophisticated eaves-
dropper, in Chapter 4 we introduced additive random jamming with large variations
to the signal, where Alice employs her cryptographically-secure key bits to select an
amplitude from a uniform discrete distribution to add to the signal. Since Bob knows
the key, he can simply subtract off the jamming signal and continue normal decoding
with an A/D converter well-matched to the span of the signal. However, Eve does not
have knowledge of the key and thus has difficulty matching the span of her A/D to
the received signal. As before, we assumed that the key is handed to Eve as soon as
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transmission is complete, and obviously Eve could simply subtract the jamming sig-
nal off of her recorded samples in memory. But, as before, a nonlinear operation (the
analog-to-digital converter) has processed the signal, hence allowing the possibility of
information-theoretic secrecy even when the secret key is handed to Eve immediately
after the transmission. Indeed, with her poorly matched A/D, Eve will not have
recorded a reasonable version of the signal and we will see that information-theoretic
security can be obtained. In the numerical results of Chapter 4 we have shown that
this method can also provide secrecy even in the case that the eavesdropper has per-
fect access to the output of the transmitter’s radio and an A/D of much better quality
than that of the intended receiver, without being susceptible to the risk of the power
modulation approach of Chapter 3. In the continuation of Chapter 4, we considered
a wideband system, where the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper have access to
wideband channels. We used the fact that the product of bandwidth and resolution
of an A/D is limited by its aperture jitter. Since the channel bandwidth is larger
than the signal bandwidth, the legitimate nodes can employ frequency hopping in
conjunction with the additive random jamming approach. With this extra degree of
freedom, Eve is forced to make an additional trade-off between A/D resolution and
sampling frequency. Considering technology trend lines and fundamental limits for
A/Ds, we have shown that this poses a significant challenge to Eve.
Broadly considering potential techniques for everlasting secrecy in wireless sys-
tems, including those proposed here, yields that each approach still holds some risk.
In the case of cryptographic secrecy, assumptions must be made on both the hardness
of the problem and the current/future computational capabilities of the adversary.
In the case of standard information-theoretic security, assumptions must be made
on the quality of the channel to Eve, generally corresponding to limitations on her
location. In the method proposed here, assumptions must be made on Eve’s current
conversion hardware capabilities, but, as in standard information-theoretic secrecy,
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there is no assumption on future capabilities. All three approaches thus have different
applicability.
6.1 Future Work
Physical layer secrecy in small and large wireless networks has been studied ex-
tensively in the literature. But most of today wireless networks can be classified as
moderate size networks, and thus secrecy in moderate size networks is of practical
interest. However because of its difficulties, secrecy in moderate size networks often
has not received the deserved attention. For instance, consider a multi-hop network in
which the source wants to convey a message to the destination in a multi-hop fashion,
where multiple passive eavesdroppers of unknown locations and CSIs are present in
the network. When the location and CSI of the eavesdroppers are not known to the
legitimate nodes, the usual information-theoretic methods are not reliable. Even if
we are able to find some probabilistic model for the location of each eavesdropper,
the energy consumption of cooperative jamming approach when there is moderate
uncertainty in the location of eavesdroppers is very high [27]. In this case, we can
turn to the method of Chapter 4 to obtain secrecy at a reasonable price. The source
and intermediate relays add a random jamming signal to the message to protect it
from being intercepted by the eavesdroppers at each hop (Appendix B).
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APPENDIX A
ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SECRECY RATE
In this section we show that as r → ∞ the only strategy that Eve can take to
obtain information from the signal she receives is to choose either G(r) = Θ(1) or
G(r) = Θ(r−1). Instead of applying G(r) = Θ(1) or G(r) = Θ(r−1), the two other
possibilities for Eve are to choose G(r) such that either limr→∞ r−1/G(r) → 0 or
limr→∞ r−1/G(r)→∞ (and obviously provided that G(r) 6= Θ(1)).
First suppose limr→∞ r−1/G(r)→ 0 and consider I(X;Z|A = A1) in (3.17). Since
G(r) 6= Θ(1) and from (3.16), limr→∞A1/G(r)→ 0 and hence,
h(Z) =
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))∫ a
−a
−fZ|E′1(z) log(fZ|E′1(z))dz (A.1)
where, for |z| < l,
fZ|E′1(z) =
1
δ
(
Q
(
G(r)(z − δ/2)
A1
√
P
)
−Q
(
G(r)(z + δ/2)
A1
√
P
))
→

1
δ
, 0 < |z| < δ/2
1
2δ
, |z| = δ/2
0, otherwise
and
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))
→ 1 as r → ∞. Since the integrand in (A.1) is bounded for
all r and from the dominated convergence theorem, h(Z) → log δ as r → ∞. Also,
since limr→∞ r−1/G(r)→ 0,
h(Z|X) = log(δ)
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))
→ log(δ) (A.2)
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as r approaches ∞ and thus I(X;Z|A = A1) = 0. Now consider I(X;Z|A = A2) in
(3.17); by substituting A1 with A2 in (A.1) and (A.2), and since limr→∞A2/G(r)→ 0,
we have I(X;Z|A = A2) = 0. Consequently, given that limr→∞ r−1/G(r) → 0, the
average information that Eve obtains is zero.
Now suppose limr→∞ r−1/G(r)→∞ and consider the first term I(X;Z|A = A1)
in (3.17). The fact that limr→∞ r−1/G(r) → ∞ implies that in the limit as r → ∞,
A1/G(r) also goes to ∞ and thus from (3.8) and (3.14) we have fZ|E′1(z)→ 0. Also,(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))
→ 0 as r approaches infinity and hence h(Z)→ 0. Furthermore,
h(Z|X) = log(δ)
(
1− 2Q
(
G(r)l
A1
√
P
))
→ 0 (A.3)
as r →∞ and thus I(X;Z|A = A1) = 0. Considering I(X;Z|A = A2) in (3.17) and
by putting A2 instead of A1 in (A.3), since A2/G(r)→∞ in the limit as r →∞, we
have I(X;Z|A = A2) = 0. Hence, by choosing limr→∞ r−1/G(r) → ∞ Eve gets no
information about the transmitted signal.
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APPENDIX B
SECRECY IN MODERATE SIZE NETWORKS
We consider a wireless network with nodes that are distributed arbitrarily. A
source node generates the message and conveys it to a destination node in a multi-
hop fashion. A H-hop path from the source to the destination is denoted by Γ =
〈l1, . . . , lH〉, where li is the link that connects two nodes Si and Di along the path
Γ. There are also some eavesdroppers present in the network such that the message
transmission of each link is prone to be overheard by multiple eavesdroppers. The
eavesdroppers are assumed to be passive. Hence, the location and the channel state
information of the eavesdroppers are not known to the legitimate nodes. We assume
that the system nodes are equipped with omni-directional antennas while the eaves-
droppers can (probably) be equipped with more sophisticated directional antennas.
For the channel, we consider transmission in a quasi-static Raleigh fading envi-
ronment. Let hS,D be the fading coefficient between node S and node D. Without
loss of generality, we assume E[|hS,D|2] = 1. Suppose the transmitter S transmits the
signal xS. The signal that the receiver or eavesdropper D receives is:
y˜D =
xShS,D
d
α
2
S,D
+ nD
where dS,D is the distance between S and D, α is the path-loss exponent, and nD ∼
N (0, σ2B) is AWGN at the receiver D.
We also consider the effect of A/D on the received signal, which consists of the
quantization noise and the quantizer’s overflow. The quantization noise is result of
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the limited resolution of the A/D, and the quantizer’s overflow happens when range
of the received signal is larger than the span of the A/D converter. We assume that
the quantization noise is uniformly distributed [84, Section 5]. The resolution of a
b-bit quantizer with full dynamic range [−r, r] is δ = 2r
2b
. Since the power of the
received signal is PS |hS,D|
2
dαS,D
, we set r = l
√
PS |hS,E |
d
α/2
S,E
, where l is a constant that maximize
the mutual information between the transmitted signal and the received signal [73].
Hence, the resolution of the A/D of the receiver D is:
δ =
l
√
PS|hS,E|
2bd
α/2
S,E
.
B.1 Approach: Random Jamming for Secrecy
We use the random jamming scheme of [75] to provide everlasting secrecy. In this
scheme, based on a cryptographic key that is shared between the legitimate nodes, a
jamming signal with large variation is added to the transmitted signal. It is assumed
that the cryptographic key should be kept secret just for the time of transmission, and
can be revealed to the eavesdroppers right after transmission without compromising
secrecy. The legitimate receiver can use its key to cancel the effect of the jamming
before analog to digital conversion (A/D) while the eavesdroppers must record the
signal and jamming, and cancel the effect of jamming later from the recorded signal
(after analog to digital conversion). Hence, the signal that the legitimate receiver
receives is well-matched to its A/D converter. On the other hand, the large variations
of the random jamming signal causes overflows of the eavesdroppers’ A/Ds. The
eavesdropper may enlarge the span of her A/D to prevent overflows; however, it
degrades the resolution of its A/D, thus increasing the A/D noise. In [75], it is shown
that although by increasing the span of A/D the eavesdropper would suffer from more
quantization noise, the overflows are more harmful and thus the best strategy that
the eavesdropper can develop is to enlarge the span of its A/D such that it captures
all the signal and thus no overflow occurs.
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The jamming signal J follows a uniform distribution with 2K jamming levels.
Hence, K bits of the cryptographic key to generate each jamming symbol is needed.
The distance between two consecutive jamming levels is 2l
√
PS [75]. Thus, the average
jamming power is,
PJ = E[J
2]
=
1
2K
2K−1∑
j=0
(2l
√
PSj)
2
=
4l2PS
2K
2K−1∑
j=0
j2
=
4l2PS
2K
× 2
3K+1 − 3× 22K + 2K
6
=
2l2(22K+1 − 3× 2K + 1)
3
PS (B.1)
Suppose that the eavesdropper uses a bE bit A/D. Since the eavesdropper enlarge
the span of its A/D to capture all the signal, the span of the eavesdropper’s A/D
will be 2K times the span of its A/D without jamming. Thus, the resolution of
eavesdropper’s A/D is:
δ′E =
2l
√
PS|hS,E|2
2bEdαS,E
× 2K = 2l
√
PS|hS,E|2
2bE−KdαS,E
(B.2)
B.1.1 Metric
Since the quantization noise is assumed to be uniformly distributed, the derivation
of the capacity of the channel between transmitter rand receiver and the channel
between transmitter and eavesdropper is not straightforward. Fortunately, upper
bound and lower bound for the capacity of a channel with independent additive noise
exist [70, 35]. The capacity of the channel between the transmitter S and the receiver
D conditioned on the fading coefficient can be lower bounded as [75]:
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CS,D ≥ log
 PS |hS,D|2dαS,D + θ2PJ |hS,D|2dαS,D + σ2B + δ2B12
θ2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
 , (B.3)
and the capacity of the channel between the transmitter S and the eavesdropper E
can be upper bounded as [75]:
CS,E ≤ log
 PS |hS,E |
2
dαS,E
+ σ2E +
δ
′2
E
12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2pie
 , (B.4)
In order to guarantee secrecy, the capacity of the channel between transmitter and
eavesdropper should be less than a predetermined threshold, and in order to guarantee
proper signal reception at the legitimate receiver, the capacity of the main channel
should be greater than another predetermined threshold. let us define,
γE =
PS |hS,E |2
dαS,E
+ σ2E +
δ
′2
E
12
σ2E +
δ
′2
E
2pie
, (B.5)
and,
γB =
PS |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+
θ2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
θ2PJ |hS,D|2
dαS,D
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
.
The eavesdropper is not able to obtain the message if,
γE < γ
∗
E
and the communication between the legitimate nodes is reliable if,
γB ≥ γ∗B
where γ∗E and γ∗B are two predetermined thresholds.
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B.2 Analysis
Our goal is to find the optimal path with minimum energy consumption that
connects the source to the destination:
Π∗ = argΠ∈Π¯ minP(Π)
where Π¯ is the set of all routes from the source to the destination, and P(Π) is the
cost of establishing the path Π. In other words, P(Π) is the total power of the source
and the relay nodes, which consists of the power to transmit the message
∑
li∈Π PSi ,
and the jamming power
∑
li∈Π PJi . Hence, our optimization criterion is,
P(Π) = min
∑
li∈Π
PSi + PJi (B.6)
Suppose Π = 〈l1, . . . , lH〉. By applying the coding technique described in [42], securing
each hop is sufficient to ensure end-to-end secrecy. Hence, we consider the following
secrecy constraints,
γEi < γ
∗
E, ∀li ∈ Π (B.7)
Transmission is reliable provided that an end-to-end outage probability is guaranteed,
i.e.
pSDOUT = 1−
∏
li∈Π
(1− p(γBi < γB)) ≤  (B.8)
Also, the following constrains should be satisfied,
PSi ≥ 0, and PJi ≥ 0 (B.9)
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Suppose that the number of key bits per jamming symbol that Si utilizes is denoted
by Ki. From (B.1),
PJi =
2l2(22Ki+1 − 3× 2Ki + 1)
3
PSi
Let us define βi = 2l
2(22Ki+1−3×2Ki+1)
3
. Hence, the optimization criterion can be written
as,
P(Π) = min
∑
li∈Π
PSi(1 + βi) (B.10)
Now let us consider the security constraint. By substituting δ′E from (B.2) to
(B.5), we have,
γE =
PS |hS,E |2
dαS,E
(1 + 1
12×22bE−2K ) + σ
2
E
PS |hS,E |2
2piedαS,E2
2bE−2K + σ
2
E
< γ∗E (B.11)
Since we do not want to limit the eavesdropper’s receiver quality, we assume σ2E = 0.
Hence,
γEi =
PSi |hSi,E |2
dαSi,E
(1 + 1
12×22bE−2Ki )
PSi |hSi,E |2
2piedαSi,E
22bE−2Ki
=
1 + 1
12×22bE−2Ki
1
2pie22bE−2Ki
< γ∗E (B.12)
Thus, in order to guarantee secrecy, the following lower bound for the number of key
bits per jamming symbol Ki at each hop must be satisfied:
Ki >
1
2
log2(
2pie22bE
γ∗E − pie/6
) (B.13)
The interesting fact about this bound is that it does not depend on the eavesdropper
channel, legitimate channel, or the transmit power. Hence, the same number of key
bits per jamming symbol K can be used in all hops,
K =
⌈
1
2
log2(
2pie22bE
γ∗E − pie/6
)
⌉
. (B.14)
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Because βi only depends on Ki, let us define β = βi, i = 1, . . . , H. Since β is an
increasing function of K, using the K of (B.14) is equivalent to minimizing β. Hence,
our optimization criterion turns into,
P(Π) = min
∑
li∈Π
PSi (B.15)
Consider the reliability constraint (B.8). The probability of outage at Di is,
p(γBi < γ
∗
B) = p(
PSi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ θ2
PJi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
θ2
PJi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
< γ∗B)
= p(
PSi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ θ2
βPSi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
θ2
βPSi |hSi,Di |2
dαSi,Di
+ σ2B +
δ2B
12
< γ∗B)
= p(|hSi,Di |2 <
(γ∗B − 1)(σ2B + δ
2
B
12
)
PSi(1− (γ∗B − 1)θ2β)/dαSi,Di
)
= 1− e
− (γ
∗
B−1)(σ
2
B+
δ2B
12 )
PSi
(1−(γ∗
B
−1)θ2β)/dα
Si,Di
Hence, the end-to-end outage probability is,
pSDOUT = 1−
∏
li∈Π
e
− (γ
∗
B−1)(σ
2
B+
δ2B
12 )
PSi
(1−(γ∗
B
−1)θ2β)/dα
Si,Di (B.16)
= 1− e
−∑li∈Π (γ∗B−1)(σ2B+ δ
2
B
12 )
PSi
(1−(γ∗
B
−1)θ2β)/dα
Si,Di ≤  (B.17)
Thus,
∑
li∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
≤ log(
1
1−)(1− (γ∗B − 1)θ2β)
(γ∗B − 1)(σ2B + δ
2
B
12
)
(B.18)
The left side of this inequality is a decreasing function of PSi . Since we need to
find the minimum PSi , we can substitute the inequality with equality in the above
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equation. Let us define η =
log( 1
1− )(1−(γ∗B−1)θ2β)
(γ∗B−1)(σ2B+
δ2
B
12
)
. From (B.15) and (B.18), our goal is
to solve the following optimization problem,
min
PSi≥0
∑
li∈Π
PSi (B.19)
subject to:
∑
li∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
= η (B.20)
This optimization problem can be solved using the Lagrange multipliers technique,
∂
∂PSi
{∑
li∈Π
PSi + λ
(∑
li∈Π
dαSi,Di
PSi
− η
)}
= 0, i = 1, . . . , H. (B.21)
Hence,
1− λd
α
Si,Di
P 2Si
= 0, i = 1, . . . , H, (B.22)
and thus,
PSi =
√
λdαSi,Di (B.23)
From (B.20) and (B.23),
λ =
1
η2
(√
dαSi,Di
)2
(B.24)
Hence, from (B.23) and (B.24) the optimal transmit power at each link is given by,
PSi =
1
η
√
dαSi,Di
∑
lk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk (B.25)
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The optimal cost of path Π is,
P(Π) = 1 + β
η
(∑
lk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk
)2
(B.26)
B.2.1 Routing Algorithm
Assign the link weight
√
dαSi,Di to each potential link of the network. Then,
run a classical shortest-path algorithm like Dijkstra to find the route Π with min-
imum total weight, which is
∑
li∈Π
√
dαSi,Di . Clearly this route also minimizes the
source-destination cost of (B.26). From (B.25), each node along Π forwards the
message to the next node using the total (transmit and jamming) power P(li) =
1+β
η
√
dαSi,Di
∑
lk∈Π
√
dαSk,Dk .
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